The Shadow State and Refugees: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation by Judkins, Austin Penrod
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
8-2011
The Shadow State and Refugees: The Role of
Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation
Austin Penrod Judkins
ajudkins@utk.edu
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Judkins, Austin Penrod, "The Shadow State and Refugees: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation. " Master's
Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2011.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/985
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Austin Penrod Judkins entitled "The Shadow State and
Refugees: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation." I have examined the final
electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Geography.
Micheline van Riemsdijk, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Stephanie A. Bohon, Ronald Foresta
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
 
To the Graduate Council:  
 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Austin Penrod Judkins entitled “The 
Shadow State and Refugees: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee 
Participation.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and 
content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Geography. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 ______________________________ 
 Micheline van Riemsdijk , Major Professor 
                        
                                         
We have read this thesis 
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Stephanie A. Bohon 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Ronald Foresta 
 
 
 
 
 Accepted for the Council: 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Carolyn R. Hodges 
 Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Shadow State and Refugees:   
The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented for 
The Master of Science Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austin Penrod Judkins 
August 2011 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To Belén 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
 
I would like to acknowledge the generosity and helpfulness of those at the Refugee 
Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities in Miami.  In particular, I am grateful to 
Raul Hernandez who has been a wealth of information and a great help to this thesis.  
Finally, I would like to acknowledge Hiram Ruiz, Raul Hernandez, and Luisa Lois for 
their willingness to contribute their stories.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The devolution of welfare services in the United States has increased the importance of 
the nonprofit sector.  Geiger and Wolch argue that decentralization has left nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) under the purview of the state.  They refer to this as the “shadow 
state.” Trudeau argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state in which 
governmental agencies and NPOs are highly interdependent.  This research expands on 
the findings of Trudeau by extending the shadow state construct to the individual.  I 
examine the role of refugees in the shadow state construct and their ability to affect 
government policy through participation in NPOs and find that refugees do indeed 
play a role in the shadow state.  Through feedback, experience and, most importantly, 
by becoming part of the organization, refugees can have an impact on refugee services 
through participation in NPOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction                     1 
 Research Question                   2 
 Historical and Legal Context of the Cuban Refugee Movement in the US                         3 
Why Miami Cubans?                                                                                                           7 
 Why Catholic Charities?                    11 
            
Chapter 1:  Literature Review                15 
 Understanding the Shadow State                                                                                      15 
 The Role of Scale and the Nonprofit Sector in the Shadow State Construct                     21 
 
Chapter 2:  Methods                 25 
Chapter 3:  Case Study                 31 
 Cuban Heritage Collection                31 
  Introduction                                                                                                         31       
  Cuban Refugee Center:  Voluntary Agencies                                        32 
  Geiger and Wolch (G&W)               34 
  Trudeau (T)                 36 
  Including Refugees in the Shadow State                                                   41 
 Catholic Charities – Miami, FL               51 
  Introduction                 51 
  Feedback                 52 
  Experience                 61 
  Becoming Part of the Organization             67 
Chapter 4:  Conclusion                                        73 
Bibliography                   78 
 
vi 
 
List of Appendices                                                85 
 Appendix 1 – USCC “Family Survey”                                               86 
 Appendix 2 – USCC “Family Survey” Letter             91  
 
Vita                    92 
 
 
  
 
  
vii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: La Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity)         12 
Figure 2: Diagram of Case Study                                                                                                            32 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
[Civil society organizations] 1 provide a means for governments to 
consult migrants and thus ensure a better match between 
programmes and migrants’ actual requirements (Spencer 2005, p. 
3). 
 
 Since the 1960s, the welfare system in the United States (US) has undergone a 
devolution of services to local levels.  These changes have increased the importance of 
the nonprofit sector by increasing its role in the administration of services in the welfare 
state (Trudeau 2008).  In 1986, Geiger and Wolch (G&W) coined the term “shadow 
state” to explain the increasingly important role of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in 
the modern welfare state.  The shadow state, as defined by Wolch, is: 
[A] para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector 
organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic 
politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities 
previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within 
the purview of state control (Wolch 1990, p. xvi, in Trudeau 2008).   
 
Trudeau (T) (2008) argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state that emphasizes 
the role of NPOs through the development of interdependent relationships between 
official government agencies and the nonprofit sector.  Government agencies depend on 
NPOs for the provision of information and the distribution of services.  Conversely, the 
nonprofit sector relies on the government for funding.  Trudeau argues that the 
                                                 
1 Civil society entities are, “Non-governmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for 
the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society.  The term includes non-governmental 
organizations engaged in humanitarian work” (USDOS).  These entities will be referred to as 
“nongovernmental organizations,” “VOLAGs”, “voluntary agencies” and the “third sector” throughout 
this thesis.  These terms are used interchangeably. 
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government exerts control over NPOs, and that these organizations in turn have the 
power to influence policy, particularly as pertains to the provision of services.    
Despite this important addition to our understanding of the shadow state, 
Trudeau’s research stops short of exploring the role of refugees, or even considering if 
they have a role, in the shadow state construct.  It is the aim of this research to examine 
the role of refugees in the shadow state and their ability to affect government programs 
through participation in NPOs.  I will focus on the following three research questions: 
1. How does devolution lead to the democratization of welfare services, thereby 
better enabling service providers to meet the needs of their clients? 
2. How do refugees, through NPOs, influence services that are provided?  
3. How do actors and institutions at the local, state and national scales operate 
within the shadow state construct? 
 
 The thesis is divided into four major sections.  First, I will review literature 
pertaining to the devolution of welfare services in the US and Europe.  Second, I will 
describe the methods used to complete this research.  Third, I will present a case study 
of Cuban refugees in Miami.  The case study will be divided into two stages, namely 1) 
secondary data analysis; and 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the 
Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami.  
Lastly, I discuss the broader impacts of this thesis and provide ideas for future research.  
Before beginning, it is important to understand the historical and legal context of the 
Cuban refugee flow to the US, and why I have chosen Miami-based Cubans and 
Catholic Charities for this study. 
 
3 
 
Historical and Legal Context of the Cuban Refugee Movement in the US 
 
 
 In 1959, Fidel Castro ascended to power in Cuba after successfully overthrowing 
the Batista regime.  This event contributed to decades of exodus from the island nation.  
The exodus can be broken into roughly four waves.  The first wave of Cubans arrived 
immediately after the fall of Batista in 1959.  Within the first few years, over 200,000 
Cubans fled their country and resettled in the US (Nackerud et al. 1999).  This initial 
group of exiles was primarily upper-middle class, and they believed that Castro would 
be quickly removed from power (ibid.).  In 1961, a US-backed group of Cuban exiles 
invaded Cuba in an attempt to overthrow Castro, known as the Bay of Pigs.  This 
unsuccessful attempt was followed by several other failed coup attempts. It became 
increasingly clear that the Castro regime was not going to be immediately overthrown.  
In 1965, the second wave of Cuban exiles began arriving in the US.  From 1965-1973, 
Cubans seeking asylum in the US could board Freedom Flights from Cuba to the US 
(Nackerud et al. 1999).  These flights were organized by the US and Cuban governments 
as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (ibid.).  During eight years of flights, 
over 250,000 Cubans entered the US (ibid.).  Following a relatively calm period, the 
third wave of Cuban refugees arrived in 1980.  This wave, perhaps the most 
controversial, occurred when a group of Cubans stormed the Peruvian embassy in 
Cuba, demanding asylum.  The Peruvian government refused to hand the Cubans over 
to the Castro regime.  Infuriated, Castro withdrew all protection from the Peruvian 
embassy, underestimating the exodus that would occur.  Subsequently, thousands more 
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stormed the embassy.  Castro, in a fit of anger, allowed 125,000 people to leave Cuba 
through the port of Mariel (ibid.).  The Mariel Boatlift, as it came to be called, received 
great opposition in the US.  The vast number of exiles tested the patience of people in 
the US.  Matters were further exacerbated by stories of Castro using the boatlift to 
offload his prisoners and socially undesirable people onto the US (ibid.).  As a result, 
the Marielitos, as those who arrived in the boatlift came to be known, were not 
immediately granted refugee status (ibid.).  Eventually, in 1984, they were granted 
residency status under the Cuban Adjustment Act (ibid.).  The final wave of exiles was 
comprised of balseros (rafters).  The Balsero Crisis, beginning in 1994, consisted of the 
capture of over 28,000 Cuban rafters by US forces, and their subsequent transfer to a US 
Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (ibid.).  The balseros were detained at the base for 
eight months until the US and Cuba came to a mutual agreement that guaranteed 20,000 
regular immigration visas per year for Cubans, but eliminating their automatic refugee 
status (ibid.).  This was only one of many changes in US policy towards Cuban exiles in 
the past five decades.  
 Prior to the 1960s, refugee policy in the US focused primarily on defining who 
was or was not a refugee, but gave no consideration to resettlement (Zucker 1983).  The 
first semblance of our modern refugee system appeared in the Corporate Affidavit 
Program of 1946 (ibid.).  This program established a relationship between the 
government and VOLAGs that allowed VOLAGs to submit an affidavit of support 
(guaranteeing that the recipient would not become a public charge) on behalf of 
thousands of displaced persons who otherwise would not have qualified for 
5 
 
resettlement in the US (ibid.).  This first step was important for two reasons.  First, it 
created a legal relationship between the government and VOLAGs.  Second, the 
program was so successful that it led to the establishment of the Displaced Persons Act 
of 1948.  This act, the first significant refugee legislation in the US, assigned the 
responsibility of resettling refugees to VOLAGs (ibid.).  The VOLAGs’ first opportunity 
to exercise their new role occurred after the 1956 Hungarian uprising.  Federal funding 
supported the VOLAGs efforts to resettle Hungarian refugees, setting an important 
precedent for the Cuban refugee flow that was to follow.   
As the first Cuban exiles began to arrive, VOLAGs relied on their own resources 
to aid in their resettlement (ibid.).  However, by 1960 the number of refugees exceeded 
the financial capacity of VOLAGs (ibid.).  In December 1960, the Cuban Refugee 
Emergency Center was established by President Eisenhower and VOLAGs received 
federal funding to resettle Cuban exiles.  Two years later, Congress passed the 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, establishing the Cuban Refugee Program 
(the Program).  The Program was responsible for organizing refugee benefits, such as 
health care, housing, education, professional licensure, etc. (ibid.).  A few years later, 
Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which provided Cuban exiles a 
path to Legal Permanent Residency.   
By 1980, Congress sought to replace the Cuban-specific refugee program with a 
universal refugee program, the Refugee Act of 1980 (ibid.).  As part of this act, the US 
adopted the definition of “refugee” found in the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, “ [any person] who can establish persecution or a 
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well-founded fear of persecution in their home country on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (USDOS 
2001).  In addition, the Refugee Act of 1980 recognized the Office of the US Coordinator 
for Refugee Affairs.  The coordinator was “instructed to ‘consult regularly with States, 
localities, and private nonprofit voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship process 
and the intended distribution of refugees’” (Zucker 1983, p. 178).   Finally, the 1980 law 
established the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is responsible for the 
provision of refugee assistance (ibid.).  However, within weeks of its passage, the Act 
was met with strong opposition from Cubans (ibid.).2  In response, a new status, 
“Cuban-Haitian Entrant” was created.  This status allowed Cubans and Haitians who 
entered the US between the 21st of April and the 10th of October of 1980 to become legal 
permanent residents after one year in the US (ibid.).  A further response to the Act of 
1980 was the passage of the Fascell-Stone Amendment in 1982 that granted entrants 
equal benefits as refugees (ibid.).  Today, according to the volunteer orientation 
provided by Catholic Charities, Cuban and Haitians may enter the United States under 
“parole” status.  Parole is a conditional status granted to Cubans and Haitians upon 
arrival in the US.  This status can be adjusted to legal permanent resident after one year, 
however until that time they are considered “entrants.”  As a Cuban or Haitian entrant, 
the individual is eligible for the same benefits as a refugee.  Their interaction with the 
                                                 
2 Cubans opposed the legislation because it sought to strip many Cubans of refugee benefits.  However, 
this law was amended by the creation of the “Cuban-Haitian Entrant” status and the Fascell-Stone 
Amendment that guaranteed entrants the same assistance as refugees. 
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Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities is the same, their orientation and 
services are the same, and therefore all will be referred to as “refugees” in this paper.  
 
Why Miami Cubans? 
 
 
 This research focuses on the Cuban population of Miami.  The Cuban exile 
community in Florida has been the focus of national attention for the past half century.  
Their public exodus from Cuba started in the 1950s and continues today, and it has 
been well documented and heavily publicized.  I chose to study Cubans in Miami 
primarily because of the availability of data on this community.  For example, The 
Cuban Heritage Collection, housed at the University of Miami and home to a large 
collection of records relating to the Cuban diaspora, was especially important for this 
thesis.  
 The location of this collection in Miami is fitting, as Florida is home to 68% of the 
Cuban population in the US (Pew 2006).  Familial ties, cultural and climatic similarities, 
and the geographic proximity to Cuba all contribute to the dense settlement of Cubans 
in South Florida.  However, modern Miami’s importance as a Latino center extends 
beyond the Cuban community.  Jaime Roldos, past president of Ecuador, illustrated the 
importance of Miami to the Americas when he named Miami “the capital of Latin 
America.”  Miami earned this title because of the large Latino population and the strong 
touristic and business ties between the city and Latin America (Levine 1985).  According 
to 2008 statistics released by the Pew Hispanic Center (based on US Census statistics), 
62% of the Miami-Dade county population identifies itself as Hispanic (Pew 2010).  
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Despite its domestic significance as one of the fastest growing Sunbelt cities, Miami has 
increasingly depended on Latin America for its economic growth (Levine 1985).  It 
comes as no surprise, given its geographic location, that Miami has come to serve as the 
gateway between the Americas.  Latin investors have turned to Miami not only as a 
tourist destination, but for its friendly business environment.  Miami offers a stable 
economic and social environment where financial establishments have flourished and 
business can be conducted in a stable and secure environment (in stark contrast to the 
volatility of many Latin American markets) (Levine 1985).  No single group has been 
more responsible for Miami’s ascent than the Cubans (Levine 1985; McHugh et al. 1997; 
Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Portes and Stepick 1993).   
 One Cuban banker put it this way, 
Miami was a typical southern city, with an important population of 
retirees and veterans […].  No one thought of transforming Miami 
into what it is today.  It is no exaggeration to say that the motor of 
this Great Change were the Cuban men and women […].  These 
last decades have witnessed the foundation of a dynamic and 
multi-faceted Miami over the past of a Miami that was merely 
provincial and tourist-oriented.  Today, the level of progress has 
reached unanticipated heights (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, p. 156). 
 
Cubans have made Miami their own through tremendous political involvement.  
According to McHugh et al. (1997, p. 515) “Cubans are one of the most geographically 
concentrated immigrant ethnic groups in the United States.  […] Rather than 
assimilating in the classic sense, Miami Cubans have remade the city in their own 
image.”  Portes and Rumbaut (2006) recount an example how Cubans in Miami used 
their concentrated numbers and political will to vote out politicians who favored 
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unpopular policies, such as an anti-bilingual referendum, and replaced them with exile 
Cuban candidates.  The political clout of Miami Cubans extends beyond the local and 
into state and federal levels as well (i.e. Hiram Ruiz, Director of Refugee Services for 
Florida Department of Children and Families, Senator Mel Martinez and the newly 
elected Senator Marco Rubio) (McHugh et al. 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). 
 Civil society is helpful in understanding the success of Cubans in Miami.  Civil 
society is a network of community associations that represent the needs of a group 
(Espinoza 1999; Foley et al. 1996).  The roots of civil society can be traced to eighteenth-
century “Scottish moralists,” such as Adam Smith (Foley et al. 1996, p. 39).  
Enlightenment thinkers considered the associations of civil society as necessary for 
civility and democratic vitality (ibid.).  Civil society organizations are often the 
“byproduct of religion, tradition, [and] shared historical experience” (Fukuyama 2001, 
p. 7).  All cultures are based on shared norms, and these norms serve to encourage 
cooperation within a community (ibid.).  This has certainly been the case with Cubans 
in Miami.  Historically, Cuban exiles have relied heavily on the Cuban community in 
Miami for support.  In return, new members of the community have been expected to 
vote for Cuban-supported politicians – as illustrated by the anti-bilingual referendum 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  A defining characteristic of civil society is unified 
action to solve problems, which relies on cooperation  (Lehning 1997).  The Cuban 
community in Miami uses its unified voice to pressure authorities and to engender 
bottom-up change.  In this way, civil society can be seen as “a form of societal self-
organization which allows for cooperation with the state” (Hall 1998, p. 32).  Citizen 
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participation in voluntary associations and community organizations helps to sustain 
civil society by building trust within the community, potentially leading to greater 
political participation (Newton 2001).  Furthermore, participation in community 
associations reinforces relationships and strengthens the social networks of members, 
thereby strengthening communities (Lehning 1997).   
 The Cuban community in Miami has used its social capital to build a strong civil 
society.  The result has been a powerful ethnic community that has changed the face of 
Miami-Dade County through strong local and national political participation.  
However, it is important to note the uniqueness of Cuban exiles.  Cubans, as a group, 
have been exceptional in their high political participation.  This is due, in part, to the 
high levels of educational and professional attainment of many members of the Cuban 
exile community in Miami.  The political strength of the Cuban community is also aided 
by its location in the most populous county of one of the most important swing states.  
Nevertheless, the Cuban community is a unique example how civil society 
organizations  can instigate change from the bottom-up, while simultaneously using the 
shadow state to encourage change at the highest levels of government.         
 Civil society can help explain the success of the Cuban community from a 
bottom-up perspective.  However, I am interested in the ways in which government-
sanctioned voluntary agencies can use the federal refugee resettlement program to 
scale-up the needs of refugees to state and federal governmental organizations.  It is 
due to the Cubans’ propensity for political participation that I have decided to study 
how Cuban refugees may use voluntary agencies as a platform for political 
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participation.  Specifically, I am interested in how refugees can voice their needs and 
concerns through local NPOs and how nonprofit organizations, such as the Refugee 
Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities, “scale up” their influence.   
 
Why Catholic Charities? 
 
 
 Of the organizations available to Cuban refugees, Catholic Charities has proven 
to be one of the most influential because of its early and profound involvement with the 
Cuban Diaspora (Walsh 1971).  The vast majority of Cubans are, at least nominally, 
Catholic.  This has placed the Catholic Church in a unique position to aid arriving 
refugees, catering to both corporeal and spiritual needs.  Tweed (1997) highlights the 
concern of the Catholic Church with respect to the Cuban situation and the importance 
of the creation of the Archdiocese of Miami.  Shortly after the arrival of the first Cuban 
exiles in 1959, Archbishop Carroll encouraged the establishment of la Ermita de la Virgen 
de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity) in Miami to, as Tweed recounts, “tend 
to the unchurched3 in the exile community” (Tweed 1997, p. 38).  This shrine has 
become an important symbol of the Cuban diaspora in Miami, creating both a spiritual 
connection to the remembered Cuba of the past and a “physical” connection through 
radio broadcasted sermons from the shrine that reach the island nation (Tweed 1997).   
 
                                                 
3 The term “unchurched” refers to those who are not actively practicing their faith (Catholicism in this 
case), and in particular to those who practice some form of synchronistic religion (the combination of two 
or more religions to form a single hybrid religion), such as Santeria. 
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Figure 1.  La Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity)  
(Source: http://www.ermitadelacaridad.org/ermita.html)  
 
 Another account that further emphasizes the role of the Catholic Church in 
responding to the Cuban exodus comes from Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh, the Episcopal 
Vicar for Spanish-Speaking Peoples of the Catholic Archdiocese of Miami.  In 1960, 
Walsh created a program for the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban youth from 
communist Cuba to the US that came to be known as Operation Pedro Pan.  While in the 
initial stage of logistical planning, Walsh’s organization, the Catholic Welfare Bureau, 
worked in tandem with other organizations of Protestant and Jewish faiths to organize 
the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban minors to the US.  Walsh recognized that his 
Catholic Welfare Bureau bore a unique responsibility to the Cuban children, a 
sentiment made clear by the following statement, “Since most Cubans were at least 
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nominally Catholic, it was recognized that the main burden would fall on the Catholic 
Welfare Bureau” (Walsh 1971, p. 388).   
 In my consideration of nonprofit organizations it became clear that Catholic 
Charities offered the best opportunity to employ, as Kodras (1997, p. 80) has suggested, 
a “flexible use of scale and scope.”4  The aforementioned responsiveness and sense of 
obligation of the Catholic Church to the Cuban diaspora made Catholic Charities a 
natural choice for this project.  In addition, as will be seen, Catholic Charities has an 
impressive network of governmental and nongovernmental partnerships that offer a 
good example of how an organization can transcend scale.  For instance, Catholic 
Charities has “scaled up” its power to the national scale.  It becomes clear in Walsh’s 
account that the Catholic Church actively organized local efforts on the ground, in both 
Cuba and the United States, while simultaneously cooperating with other religious and 
governmental organizations (within and outside of the Catholic Charities umbrella) to 
petition the federal government for financial aid.  Their on-the-ground-expertise and 
experience was well received by government and business officials alike, who were 
needed for the financial backing of the operation.  Ultimately, they secured funding for 
the program through an impressive network of nonprofit, commercial, and government 
agencies.  Throughout the organization of Operation Pedro Pan, Walsh was in continuous 
contact with actors at various scales.  At the local level, Cuban and Cuban-American 
                                                 
4 A flexible use of scale and scope refers to “institutions and groups operating in one place draw[ing] on the 
resources and abilities of institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to meet societal 
responsibilities” (Kodras 1997, p. 80).   
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Catholics approached Walsh and the Catholic Church for help.  In response, Walsh used 
his local contacts to coordinate with leaders of other local nonprofit organizations who, 
together, applied for financial aid from the federal government to relocate Cuban 
youths to the US.  In a 1971 journal article published in the Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, Walsh writes about the experience of working with 
employees of the U.S. Department of State (USDOS), US presidential advisors, foreign 
governmental officials, child welfare agencies, and officials from Catholic, Protestant 
and Jewish faith based organizations to provide information regarding the resettlement 
of Cubans in Miami (Walsh 1971).   
 Catholic Charities’ impressive network of aid organizations that span the local, 
state, national and international scale provide a unique opportunity to understand how 
a voluntary organization can scale-up the needs of its clientele.  Additionally, the Cuban 
diaspora has been well documented.  Information, such as that available in the Cuban 
Heritage Collection, provides strong contextual footing for this thesis.  Using this 
information and a case study of Cuban refugees in the Refugee Resettlement Program 
of Catholic Charities of Miami, I will investigate the ways in which nonprofit 
organizations include refugees in the political process.  Using qualitative research 
methods, I aim to provide empirical evidence to support Spencer’s (2005, p. 3) claim 
that local NPOs “provide a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure 
a better match between programmes and migrants’ actual requirements.”  
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CHAPTER 1:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Understanding the Shadow State 
 
 
 Beginning in the 1960s, the US and many other developed nations partly 
privatized welfare service delivery (Kramer 2000; Wolch 1990).  The restructuring of the 
welfare sector intensified during the 1970s and 1980s due to economic pressures from a 
global recession (Wolch 1990).  Governments increasingly used and funded nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) for service provision, which resulted in a worldwide increase in 
the number of NPOs (Kramer 2000).  The number of NPOs in the United States alone 
increased from 50,000 in the 1940s to 1,400,000 in 2000 (ibid.).  Increased governmental 
funding of NPOs for the provision of welfare services has been the main impetus 
behind their increase in the US (Nightingale et al. 1997).  Through grants and subsidies, 
the US government has “become a more important source of revenue in the nonprofit 
sector than all private giving combined” (Kramer 1989, in Wolch 1990, p. x).  The 
increasing importance of government funding to NPOs is particularly important to 
refugee resettlement because almost all countries, including the US, that offer refugee 
resettlement services depend on some kind of public-private partnership (Wright 1981).  
The increased importance of the voluntary sector could, as suggested by Geiger and 
Wolch (1986), lead to the emergence of a shadow state.  In a shadow state, voluntary 
agencies are largely responsible for shouldering the burden of the welfare sector, while 
remaining under the auspices of the state (Geiger and Wolch 1986).  Wolch and Rocha 
(1993) argue that governmental responsibilities for welfare services are increasingly 
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moved to the voluntary sector.  Geiger and Wolch (1986) are concerned that NPOs that 
operate as part of a shadow state are “I) less accountable to the public, II) outside key 
democratic controls, and III) remain circumscribed by government” (p. 364). However, 
despite these concerns, the offloading of governmental welfare responsibilities has 
enjoyed great public support for a variety of reasons.  Kramer, in the introduction to 
Wolch (1990) explains that leaders on the both the Right and the Left have extolled the 
virtues of voluntarism.  Those on the Right view voluntary organizations as a manner to 
keep government small through privatization, while those on the Left consider the 
sector as a means to strengthen communities.  Despite the shadow state’s reputation as 
a tool of the political right, Wolch (1990) points out that the shadow state has been 
pursued by both liberal and conservative administrations in many countries.  In the US, 
privatization of services during the 1960s and 1970s began under democratic leadership, 
and continued under republican rule (ibid.).  Privatization accelerated under the 
Reagan administration, and was a major part of the welfare reform that President 
Clinton introduced in 1996 (Bartkowski 2003).  The bipartisan push towards 
decentralization in the US was backed by a Republican-controlled Congress and its 
Contract with America.  This program sought to reduce the size and scope of the federal 
government through the devolution of responsibilities to local and state governments.  
In 2001, President George W. Bush created the Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives (OFBCI) to increase the funding of local and faith-based organizations.  
Under this initiative, federal funding would support the delivery of social services by 
these organizations.   
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 The increasingly central role of the shadow state is a “contradictory 
phenomenon” (Wolch 1990, p. xvi).  The shadow state serves to democratize the 
provision of welfare services, while increasing the role of the government in the daily 
activities of voluntary organizations (Wolch 1990).  The implications of the shadow state 
are not, as of yet, fully understood.  Supporters of privatization point to increased 
efficiency (Geiger and Wolch 1986).5  They argue that privatization supports the 
advantages of competition, such as greater responsiveness and innovation (Nightingale 
et al. 1997).  Moreover, they argue that nongovernmental organizations can provide 
services that are two to four times cheaper than state services (Wright 1981).  Wright 
(1981) continues that VOLAGs offer “significant advantages as the vehicle for [refugee] 
resettlement” because of their flexibility and responsiveness during crisis situations (p. 
171).  In addition to flexibility and responsiveness, NPOs offer services with a “more 
human face” (Neldner 1997, p. 2).  Again, this is of particular importance to the refugee 
resettlement organizations that have longer-term responsibility for their clients.   
VOLAGs are required, by their government grant agreements, to follow-up with 
refugee-clients during the first year of resettlement (Wright 1981, pp. 172).  Follow-up 
contact with refugees is highly advantageous because of the danger of losing track of 
refugees when they enter the welfare system (ibid.).  Furthermore, VOLAGs have a 
great ability to elicit public support for refugee movements (ibid.).  Wright notes that 
VOLAG constituents often show great interest in getting involved with refugee 
                                                 
5 Opposition to privatization will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
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resettlement, and that the constituents’ interest increases public support for refugee 
admissions (ibid.).  Support for refugee movements can come in a variety of forms, 
including donations, housing, cash and community acceptance of refugee populations 
(ibid.).  Young (2000) argues that the voluntary sector can provide customized service to 
heterogeneous communities.  Governments contract out to local service providers due 
to their (government’s) inability to adequately differentiate welfare services to meet the 
needs of a heterogeneous citizenry (Young 2000).  Another key advantage of 
nongovernmental organizations is that they can work in areas where the UN and 
governmental agencies cannot, for political reasons, be involved.  One example of 
NGOs providing humanitarian support when governmental agencies were politically 
unwilling is shared by Neldner (1997).  In the late 1980s, NGOs provided food to 
conflict-ravaged areas of Ethiopia because official aid channels were unwilling to work 
with the Mengistu regime (ibid.).  Furthermore, NGOs can be used as a vehicle for 
service delivery when governmental agencies lack legitimacy.  After the 1992 Los 
Angeles riots, city officials, including the mayor and city council, formed a 
nongovernmental organization, Rebuild LA (RLA), to aid in the revitalization of poor 
neighborhoods in Los Angeles.6  City officials felt that RLA would be more legitimate, 
and therefore more effective in rebuilding post-riot Los Angeles than the government 
(Ferris 1998).  The RLA could legitimately serve community members who, because of 
the outcome of the Rodney King trial, felt disenfranchised by local government.  The 
                                                 
6 Citywide riots resulted from the not-guilty verdicts for Los Angeles police officers who were accused of 
beating Rodney King, an African American. 
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city of Los Angeles used the RLA to reestablish legitimacy by providing community 
revitalization services to the neighborhoods most affected by the 1992 riots.  
 Not everybody is supportive of the dismantling and offloading of the centralized 
state welfare system to lower levels of governance.  Wolch (1990) argues that heavy 
reliance on governmental funding will make the voluntary sector increasingly subject to 
state regulation:   
The increasing importance of state funding for many voluntary 
organizations has been accompanied by deepening penetration by 
the state into voluntary group organization, management, and 
goals.  […] the transformation of the voluntary sector into a shadow 
state apparatus could ultimately shackle its potential to create 
progressive social change (ibid., p. 15). 
 
As voluntary agencies become increasingly dependent on government grants, Wolch 
(1990) fears that they may become a “puppet or pawn in the service of goals that are 
antithetical to their organizational mission” (p. 217).  In the introduction to Wolch 
(1990), Kramer states that:  
The degree to which their advocacy seeks to promote controversial 
change—or challenge the prevailing distribution of power and 
other resources—seems to be a critical determinant of their fate and 
their ability to continue receiving governmental funding (p. xi).  
 
Wolch (1999) argues that power relations between government and nonprofit 
organizations are not equal, and that NPOs are “often junior partners” to more 
powerful governmental organizations (p. 26).  The increasing dependence of nonprofit 
organizations on government contracts decreases the ability of nonprofit organizations 
to be critical of government policy (Wolch 1990).  Voluntary groups are likely to shy 
away from “excessive activism” that may result in loss of government funding (Geiger 
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and Wolch 1986, p. 359).  Furthermore, dependence on state funding forces voluntary 
groups to plan “reactively” to government priorities, as opposed to exercising 
innovation and challenging the status quo (Wolch and Rocha 1993, p. 389).  Those 
organizations that are best able to adapt to governmental funding are often larger 
organizations.  Geiger and Wolch (1986) fear that “heightened competition among 
voluntary groups may work to the detriment of smaller less financially secure 
organizations” (p. 358). 
Geographic disparities in services are another concern.  Kodras (1997) states,  
The current reductions in the scale and scope of the American state 
will increase geographic disparities in the role and effect of 
government in accordance with the capacity of institutions and 
groups in particular places to take on functions previously 
coordinated by the national government.  The capacity to assume 
these responsibilities is defined by the extent to which fiscal 
resources, expertise, infrastructure, and political will exist, or can 
be developed, within specific locales.  In this sense, capacity for 
governance is geographically and historically produced    (Kodras 
1997, p. 80). 
 
Kodras argues that devolution will lead to a geographically uneven distribution of 
welfare services.  Moreover, those geographic regions most in need of services, such as 
inner cities, will have least access to welfare services.   
Another potential consequence of devolution is the reduction of political 
autonomy at the local level.  Peck argues that government should be close to the people, 
but that action must take place at higher scales where rules are made: 
Local action can be only part of the solution and, uncoordinated, it 
may remain part of the problem…political action must confront the 
level at which the rules of regime competition are set (the 
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supranational/global) not that at which the rules are carried out 
(the local) (Peck 1995, p. 257). 
 
Peck sees the devolution of responsibility to the local scale as “the prerequisite to the 
competitive downgrading of regulatory norms” (Peck 1995, p.255).  It is, according to 
Peck, the institutions at national and international scales that set the rules.  The local 
scale is then left to carry out these rules, but does not necessarily have the ability to 
influence them.  If Peck is correct, then local organizations need to transcend these 
scales to exert influence on the rules that locally bind them.  They must “scale up” their 
influence to the scales at which decisions are made.  Kodras (1997) argues for,  
the flexible use of scale and scope, whereby institutions and groups 
operating in one place draw on the resources and abilities of 
institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to 
meet societal responsibilities (p. 80).   
 
According to Kodras, scale becomes a key factor for understanding the role of the 
nonprofit sector in the shadow state. 
 
The Role of Scale and the Nonprofit Sector in the Shadow State Construct 
 
 
“Within the USA, the impetus of the federal welfare state since the 1970s has 
been to devolve responsibilities to lower levels” (DeVerteuil et al. 2002, p. 230).  The 
devolution of services has increased the importance of the voluntary sector, further 
incorporating it into the local welfare system and local politics (ibid.).  DeVerteuil et al. 
(2002) go on to state that the hallmarks of the voluntary sector are “accessibility, uneven 
constraints, and local uniqueness” (p. 231).  Many at the local level see the devolution of 
services as an opportunity to locate them “closer to the ground” (Taylor and Bassi 1998, 
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p. 120).  The initiative of local authorities to locate services “closer to the ground” 
illustrates two important points.  First, forces for devolution can come from below as 
well as from above.  Here we see local authorities taking the initiative to set up local 
organizations meant to influence local policy.  Secondly, a power conflict between the 
federal government and the local third sector becomes apparent, as illustrated in the 
following quote: 
At the same time that central government sought to employ the 
third sector as an agent for service delivery, it saw the sector 
deployed to some effect by politically antagonistic [local] 
authorities (Taylor and Bassi 1998, p. 120). 
 
The significance and role of the third sector varies at different scales.  While the central 
government saw the third sector as a potential apolitical agent that could cheaply 
provide services as part of a shadow state, local authorities regarded the third sector as 
a tool for organizing grass-roots participation in local politics.  Another instance of the 
dual vision of the third sector comes from the Greater London Council (GLC), as 
documented by Geiger and Wolch (1986).  GLC provided funding for innovative 
voluntary agencies in order to garner grass roots support against unpopular policies of 
the Thatcher administration.  Recognizing this, the central government attacked the 
GLC, eventually leading to its closure.  The case of GLC highlights the ideological clash 
that can exist between organizations at different scales.  GLC, at the local scale, aimed to 
mobilize grass roots support for anti-Thatcher policies.  The central government, at the 
national scale, used its power to shut down the GLC.    
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A primary objective for many organizations in the nonprofit sector is the scaling-
up of issues to raise awareness (Henderson 2002).  Henderson (2002) explains: “‘scaling-
up’ occurs when organizations extend their scope and power through […] linkages with 
other organizations” (p. 109).  One example from Neldner (1997) is the ability of NGOs 
to scale-up the concerns of those affected by forced migration to the national and 
international arena.  Neldner (1997) points out that building awareness of refugee needs 
has been a primary role of NGOs, and that these NGOs have successfully brought 
refugee issues to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  
 In another example of scaling-up, Cullen (2009) explains how pro-migrant NGOs 
in Ireland have sought to influence government policy through associations with 
governmental officials.  Through these associations, NGOs aided migrants by 
influencing officials to reconsider individual migrant cases (Cullen 2009).  Furthermore, 
these NGOs (the Migrants Rights Center of Ireland and the Immigrant Council of 
Ireland) have used international organizations, such as the European Commission (EC) 
and the United Nations (UN), as venues to fight for the rights of migrants in Ireland 
(ibid.).  For example, Cullen states that  
The UN has proved a more useful context for employing ‘shaming’ 
tactics regarding the Irish state’s record of non-compliance with 
international accords.  […] pro-migrant NGOs have supported 
cases including a July 2008 European Court of Justice ruling which 
overturned Irish restrictions on the residency rights of non-EU 
citizen spouses (Cullen 2009, p. 105). 
 
Irish pro-migrant NGOs have also used local media to exert power at the national scale.  
The NGOs used stories of individual migrants in local media to counter the 
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predominant image of immigrants as “suspect, untrustworthy free loaders who 
displace Irish workers” (Cullen 2009, p. 106).  In one instance, a local NGO produced a 
documentary that was aired on national television that highlighted the injustice and 
hypocrisy of the Irish government.  It argued that the government pushed for the 
legalization of undocumented Irish immigrants abroad while denying the same benefits 
to undocumented immigrants in Ireland (Cullen 2009).  This documentary provides 
another example how local NGOs can advance their interests at national and 
international scales.  By highlighting the commonalities of migration issues throughout 
the world, local NGOs can ostensibly reach the national and international scales where 
regime rules are established.7 
 Understanding how organizations in the nonprofit sector work at different scales 
is helpful for understanding their position in the shadow state:   
If we are to understand the impact that changes [of 
decentralization] in the state have on the third sector, we must 
understand the dynamics of the relationship between national and 
local government as well as those between the state as a whole and 
the third sector (Taylor and Bassi 1998, pp. 134-135).   
 
How these organizations work at different scales, and how they bridge the gap between 
these scales, is necessary to understanding how NPOs can facilitate refugee inclusion in 
the shadow state.  I will discuss how these scalar politics operate for Cuban refugees in 
Miami in Chapter 3.   
 
                                                 
7 An international regime is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1983, p. 2) 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHODS 
 
 
I used qualitative research methods to engage with my research questions.  
Qualitative methods are best suited for my study because they allow me to analyze the 
meanings behind people’s actions.  Discrepancies between words and actions can be 
deciphered through qualitative research (Herbert 2000).  “Ethnography […] examines 
what people do as well as what they say.  It thus enables an insightful examination of 
any discrepancies between thoughts and deeds” (Herbert 2000, p. 552, emphasis in 
original).  Qualitative methods allow a researcher to understand an observation not 
simply as a solitary point in time, but as an event within a greater context.  Clifford 
Geertz referred to this method as “thick description.”  The contextualization of 
observations within a larger framework provides deeper understandings of meaning.  
Herbert states that  
[T]he tissue of social life is not always observable.  The meanings of 
objects and events are often revealed through practices, reactions, 
cursory comments and facial expressions. […] These meanings are 
discerned through inferences, as daily practice is interpreted 
against the ethnographer’s developing understanding of the larger 
cultural system of which it is apart (Herbert 2000, p. 553).   
 
The use of qualitative research methods will allow me to better understand how 
refugees have been brought into the shadow state and the operation of scale in the 
shadow state.  A discussion of my methods follows.   
 Initially my research was divided into four stages, namely: 1) secondary data 
analysis; 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the Refugee Resettlement 
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Program, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami; 3) administration of a 
questionnaire to refugees; and 4) in-depth, semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews.  However, as is often the case in the field, my methods changed during my 
fieldwork research with the Refugee Resettlement Program.  Due to privacy concerns, 
the organization did not allow the use of interviews or questionnaires.  Instead, I 
attended weekly job seminars, and I conducted extensive archival research at the Cuban 
Heritage Collection.     
 The first research stage consisted of the compilation of contextual data on the 
shadow state and the Cuban refugee community in Miami.  I read academic journals 
and books, and conducted extensive research at the University of Miami’s Cuban 
Heritage Collection.  This collection documents more than 400 years of Cuban history in 
books, periodicals, archived materials and an extensive digital collection.  The archived 
materials and digital collection consist of photographs, manuscripts, maps, and other 
materials from individuals and organizations – from Cuba and the Cuban diaspora.  
The collection of Cuban materials increased dramatically in the 1960s, with the arrival 
of thousands of Cubans to the Miami area (Cuban Heritage Collection).  Since that time 
it has grown to be recognized as the “premier collection of materials documenting the 
Cuban exile and Cuban-American experience as well as the largest repository of 
historical and cultural Cuban materials outside of Cuba” (Cuban Heritage Collection, p. 
1).  Of greatest significance to this research, the collection became home to thousands of 
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documents from the Cuban Refugee Center (the Center) when it closed in 1994.8  These 
107 boxes of documents are found in the “Cuban Refugee Center Records.”  This section 
contained seven sub-series, namely 1) Cuban Refugee Center Documents and Programs, 
2) Government Agencies, 3) Non Governmental Agencies and Organizations, 4) 
Publications, 5) Other Documents, 6) Photographs, and 7) Clippings.  I focused 
primarily on sub-series 1-3 because I was particularly interested in documents that 
illustrated the role of the nonprofit sector and scalar relationships between 
organizations, such as local nonprofit agencies that explain their local situation to 
federal agencies.   
 The second stage consisted of participant observation with the Refugee 
Resettlement Program of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) in 
Miami, Florida.  USCCB is one of nine voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGS) that 
are contracted by the United States Department of State (USDOS) to administer federal 
services to refugees.  I obtained permission from the Volunteer Coordinator of the 
Refugee Resettlement Program, Raul Hernandez, to volunteer with the Refugee 
Resettlement Program from May 15th, 2010 to June 25th, 2010.  After his refusal to 
conduct interviews due to privacy concerns, participant observation became an 
important part of the data collection.  In participant observation, “the observer 
participates in the daily life of the people under study […] observing things that 
happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people” (Becker and Geer 1957, p. 
                                                 
8 The Cuban Refugee Center, also known as the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3.  It is also commonly referred to as the Center, a name that I will use in this thesis. 
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28).  After each session of participant observation I conducted informal discussions with 
employees of Catholic Charity.  These discussions allowed me to further investigate the 
meaning of observations in a timely manner, thereby gaining deeper insights into the 
operation of the organization.  As a volunteer I observed two types of events.  First, I 
observed the intake of two new refugees, which consists of an orientation that explains 
the program, welfare benefits and expectations for new arrivals.  Secondly, I observed 
and participated in three weekly employment meetings that were organized by job 
counselors.9  They informed newly arrived refugees about the employment system in 
the US.  This participant observation allowed me to gain deeper insights into the 
operation of the Refugee Resettlement Program and its role in enabling refugee 
participation.  Moreover, these weekly meetings led to an unanticipated insight 
regarding how to answer my research questions.  Such insights are an important merit 
of participant observation.  Bouchard (1976), explaining the benefits of participant 
observation, highlights what Merton refers to as the serendipity pattern.  “The 
serendipity pattern refers to the fairly common experience of observing an 
unanticipated, anomalous strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a 
new theory or extending an existing theory” (Merton 1949, p. 98, in Bouchard 1976).  
Through participant observation I began to see that refugees helped shape the program, 
and ultimately the system of services that they administered, by becoming part of the 
organization.  A large percentage of governmental and non-governmental resettlement 
                                                 
9 My participation was generally as the token American, confirming what the job counselor taught.  For 
example, the job counselor would use me as an example of how Americans dress for a job interview.   
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programs were staffed by refugees, many from Cuba.  This observation formed an 
unexpected yet exciting new direction for my research.  Refugees are not simply being 
brought into the resettlement system through infrequent token involvement, but rather 
through employment in the organizations that manage refugee resettlement.  This 
phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.   
My preliminary research design was comprised of four research stages, but this 
design was hindered by privacy concerns.  I have included the third and fourth step in 
this proposal to illustrate my original intentions.     
 In the third stage, I planned to administer a questionnaire to twenty-five refugees 
who currently receive aid from the Refugee Resettlement Program.  The purpose of the 
questionnaire was to collect information about the refugees’ ability to voice their needs 
within the organization, and the extent to which they felt that the organization 
responded to those needs.  The questionnaire would address the following topics: i) 
channels of communication within the organization; ii) responsiveness of the 
organization; iii) perception of the organization as a platform that can be used to voice 
opinions and needs; iv) instances when participant has voiced an opinion.  The data 
from the questionnaire would inform questions for subsequent interviews. 
 The fourth and final phase of my fieldwork research would consist of twenty in-
depth, unstructured and semi-structured interviews.  The first ten interviews would be 
semi-structured and would be conducted with refugees who were selected from the 
third stage.  Interview questions would be similar to those addressed in the 
questionnaire and would provide more detailed answers.  The next ten interviews 
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would be selected from representatives of the Refugee Resettlement Program and 
would be selected based on their ability to address questions related to the involvement 
of refugees in organizational decision making.  These interviews of representatives 
would be unstructured.  Mr. Hernandez, the volunteer coordinator, had enthusiastically 
agreed to teach me about the organization, its missions, programs, and funding sources 
before I arrived in Miami.  Unstructured interviews would allow for a flexible and 
responsive interview format that would fit into interviewee schedules and that would 
build upon the information from previous interviews, particularly with Mr. Hernandez.  
In this way, each successive interview would inform subsequent interviews.  
Beardsworth and Keil note that, “the open-ended, discursive nature of the interview 
[permits] an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by 
earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees” 
(Beardsworth and Keil, 1992, pp. 261-262). 
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CHAPTER 3:  CASE STUDY  
 
 
Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the literature chapter I explored explanations and examples of the evolution of 
the shadow state.  These examples came from varying countries, organizations, and 
welfare sectors; but all shared a common thread of welfare state devolution.  In this 
section, I will explore documents that pertain specifically to the devolution of services 
for the Cuban diaspora.  This section will ground the Cuban refugee experience into 
existing literature about the devolution of welfare services while laying the foundation 
for my conceptual extension of the shadow state construct.  Following is a discussion of 
documents from the Cuban Refugee Center that illustrate the existence of a shadow state 
among the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) involved in the Cuban diaspora.   
Figure 2 illustrates the case study presented in this chapter.  Documents from the 
Cuban Heritage Collection illustrate the need for an extended understanding of the 
shadow state, as argued in this thesis, while participant observation at the Refugee 
Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities illustrates the three methods by which 
refugees have come to be included in the shadow state. 
 
32 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Diagram of Case Study: Overlap of Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC) and Catholic 
Charities (CC) research. 
 
 
Cuban Refugee Center: Voluntary Agencies 
 
 
 In an address to “The United States Conference of Mayors,” Abraham Ribicoff, 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, recognized that voluntary agencies and the 
State of Florida had assumed a heavy financial burden to assist refugees (Ribicoff 1962).  
As the number of refugees in Miami increased, President John F. Kennedy recognized 
that volunteer agencies and the State of Florida would be unable to cope with the 
refugee situation without federal assistance and the Cuban Refugee Center was opened in 
February of 1961 (Ezquerra 2007).  The Center would function under the umbrella of the 
Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
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and the services provided were legislatively defined in the “Migration and Refugee 
Assistance Act of 1962” (Ball 1962).  These services included, “reception and 
registration, classification of skills, cash assistance and welfare services to those in need, 
resettlement and employment opportunities, and provision for education and health 
services” (Ball 1962, p. 2).  By 1962, between 1,500 and 2,000 Cubans were arriving in 
Miami every week (Ezquerra 2007).  The Center’s role, besides managing federal 
assistance, was to coordinate the complex web of governmental and independent 
organizations’ programs (ibid.).  The center became a hub for refugees and the 
organizations involved in their resettlement.  By studying the interaction between the 
federally controlled Center and the VOLAGs with whom they worked, a clear picture of 
the three different understandings of to the shadow state evolve.  The following 
discussion focuses largely on the resettlement of Cuban refugees.  This, as will be seen, 
was one of the most important roles of the Center (representing the federal 
government), and, consequently, of the VOLAGs.  The communication and relationship 
between governmental and nongovernmental organizations will also be explored 
through this lens.  Analysis of the Centers’ documents makes it clear that Geiger and 
Wolch’s understanding of the shadow state is insufficient.  Trudeau’s extended 
understanding and the conceptual extension suggested in this thesis are necessary to 
truly understand the complex relationship between the federal government (the 
Center), the VOLAGs, and the refugees themselves.  An analysis of these documents 
provides an ideal format through which to see the three different approaches to the 
shadow state construct; Geiger and Wolch, Trudeau, and that presented in this thesis.   
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Geiger and Wolch (G&W) 
 
On March 28th 1961, William L. Mitchell, Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration, sent a letter to Marshall Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center.  In 
the letter, he stated that the resettlement of refugees was a top priority of the Center 
(Wise 1961).  However, he goes on to outline a few of the major obstacles to large-scale 
resettlement, such as the refugees’ desire for a quick return to Cuba, the cold climate in 
the northern United States, and the possible lack of jobs for them in other cities (Wise 
1961).  A country as large as the United States was easily capable of handling the 1,500 – 
2,000 refugees arriving per week; however Miami-Dade County alone was not.  
Unsurprisingly, resettlement played a significant role in the federal government’s plan 
to deal with the vast number of arriving refugees, but these efforts were plagued with 
difficulties.  In order to address these obstacles there were many who felt that action 
needed to start at the top (Lyford 1962; vanden Heuvel 1963).  Calls, such as the one 
below, emphasize the top-down notion of the relationship between federal power and 
local organizations. 
For some Cubans active in politics, resettlement has become a dirty 
word.  Some of this, in the highly emotional Miami climate, was 
bound to rub off on the mass of refugees. […] We have been 
handicapped by our inability to get the resettlement message 
through to the people who speak for the many service 
organizations in the United States. […] We have reached the 
conclusion that a voice stronger than ours is needed to combat this 
organizational lethargy. […] Without leadership from the White 
House, we feel, it would be difficult to elicit a real grass-roots 
response (vanden Heuvel 1963, p. 2). 
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Interestingly, this letter was written by William J. vanden Heuvel, President of 
the International Rescue Committee, a national VOLAG, to John F. Thomas, Director of 
the federal Cuban Refugee Program in the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare.  This seems to contradict the fear of unwanted government involvement in the 
nonprofit sector that Geiger and Wolch expected; however, it still represents a top-
down power structure consistent with Geiger and Wolch’s conceptualization of the 
shadow state.  Such observations are also evident in government memorandums, 
including one written by government official Harry B. Lyford.  He states, “[the 
President’s] personal action should be the key to spark action at all levels” (Lyford 1962, 
p. 2).  He went on to say that the “President-Governor-Mayor” approach would, in his 
opinion, be the only effective means to produce positive resettlement results across the 
US (Lyford 1962, p. 3).  Lyford recognized the importance of grassroots action.  
However, he assumes that such action can only start from the highest level – the White 
House.  While such views fit well into the G&W conceptualization of the shadow state, 
further reading shows that an extended understanding of the shadow state is needed to 
understand the interaction of governmental and nongovernmental organizations.  As 
will become clear in the following section, the relationship between these entities truly 
is interdependent.  
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Trudeau (T) 
 
 
 One area of resettlement where the interdependent nature of the relationship 
between the government and VOLAGs is particularly clear is the utilization of VOLAG 
networks by the federal government.10  Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare, emphasizes the extent to which the government relies on the 
complex national web of networks established by VOLAGs. 
These agencies, with their local affiliates across the Nation, handle 
the actual resettlement of Cuban refugees by methods worked out 
through long experience.  These include careful selection of a 
destination for the refugee family – the location of sponsors to give 
them personal help in getting settled – a great deal of careful 
planning with the refugees and their sponsors – and much 
counseling – and perhaps a long period of working with a refugee 
family as it develops roots in its new home (Ribicoff 1962, p. 3). 
 
These intra-agency networks influence future resettlement decisions.  For example, the 
Center agreed to pay transportation costs for refugee resettlement from Miami to any 
city where the Refugee Center had affiliated agencies (Wise 1961).  Later in this section 
we will see how VOLAGs were instrumental in securing funding for resettlement costs; 
however, here it is important to note that the pre-existence of networks guides the 
financial decisions of the federal government.  Where networks are previously 
established, the government is willing to cover transportation costs.  Robert M. Ball, 
Commissioner of Social Security, reinforces the government’s dependence on VOLAGs.  
“For the all-important resettlement activity, we have depended primarily on the skill 
                                                 
10 A national network of service providers is a prerequisite to be contracted as an official VOLAG. 
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and dedication of the voluntary agencies and their constituents around the country” 
(Ball 1962, p. 21).  Such constituents are found wherever Catholics, Protestants, Jewish, 
or affiliates of the International Rescue Committee are found (Ribicoff 1962). 
 The national networks of voluntary agencies were a primary, but not a singular 
strength of these organizations.  Their experience in helping vulnerable populations, 
such as unaccompanied children, granted them a privileged position of experience.  
Such experiences made these organizations specially qualified to handle delicate 
assignments, such as the support of unaccompanied children.  Regarding the support 
and protection of unaccompanied children, Secretary Abraham A. Ribicoff states that, 
“[t]his program should make use of experienced national voluntary agencies in this 
field” (Mitchell 1961a, p. 6).  However, more than simply being entrusted with greater 
responsibility, voluntary organizations were valued for their unparalleled knowledge 
and expertise. 
 The importance of the voluntary agencies was not lost on Robert M. Ball, 
Commissioner of Social Security, who, soon after assuming his position, called a 
meeting with voluntary agency executives.  In this meeting, Ball and the executives 
revised resettlement policy and instituted a transition allowance to fund refugee 
resettlement outside Miami (Ball 1962).  This emphasizes the important role of the 
voluntary agencies, that the new Secretary would call a meeting with them “soon” after 
assuming his position (Ball 1962, p. 14).  Furthermore, it illustrates the role of the 
VOLAGs in the instituting of the transition allowance – money given to a refugee upon 
being relocated to make the initial arrival easier for the refugee and the host-family.  
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The Secretary goes on to say that, “We took [this] step following consultations with the 
voluntary agencies associated with us in resettlement work, and we believe the 
transition allowance has contributed significantly to the increase in resettlement” (Ball 
1962, p. 7).  The transition allowance was a recommendation made by VOLAGs, based 
on feedback that they had received from refugees and potential host-families.  Refugees 
were uncomfortable resettling with no money to speak of, and the arrival of a refugee 
put a burden on host-families who faced up-front expenses when the refugee arrived 
(Ball 1962).  Using their expertise, and their extensive contact with refugees and host-
families, the voluntary agencies recommended the implementation of a transition 
allowance.  The effect of this allowance was two-fold; it eased the concerns of refugees, 
removing a stumbling block to resettlement, while simultaneously increasing the 
number of potential host-families by addressing their immediate financial concerns.  
Such expertise can come only from on-the-ground organizations, such as VOLAGs, and 
was clearly appreciated by government agents, such as those at the Center. 
 As a result of their important role in the administration of services, their central 
role in the resettlement process, and their close contact with refugees, VOLAGs became 
an important source of information for Center staff.  Weekly staff meetings were held at 
the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami and included the heads of voluntary agencies and the 
executive staff of the Center (Wise 1961).  Such meetings were instituted, “for the 
exchange of ideas, and the tightening and smoothing of procedures” (Wise 1961, p. 4).  
One document lists as a Basic Objective, “[c]loser coordination among the voluntary 
agencies at the Center to provide an opportunity for interagency discussion of mutual 
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problems” (Lazell 1962b, p. 2).  The document recommends the involvement of 
representatives of resettlement agencies (VOLAGs) and government officials at all 
panels that were convened to review the cases of refugees who refused to accept 
resettlement opportunities outside of the Miami area (Lazell 1962b).  These panels 
convene when a refugee who is invited to resettle refuses the offer, preferring to stay in 
Miami.  Implicit in such objectives is recognition of VOLAGs as sources of experience 
and knowledge.   
Such experience was appreciated in Washington D.C. as well, where voluntary 
organization leaders were called to testify before Congress about the refugee program.  
In one such event, Gaynor I. Jacobson, the Executive Director of United HIAS service, 
testified before a Senate Subcommittee headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Rosen 
1966).  In his testimony, the Director commended the subcommittee for revising labor 
regulations that negatively impacted refugees, while simultaneously urging them to go 
further (Rosen 1966).  This was not a singular testimony, and in fact Jacobson testified 
before the same subcommittee at a later date (Rosen 1966).  Information from the 
voluntary sector reached government officials through other means than official 
testimony as well.  In one instance, Senator Robert Kennedy mentioned that, “various 
social agencies specializing in work with refugees tell us of case after case where 
companies report their special delight with their new Cuban employees” (Kennedy, R.F. 
1966, p. 2, emphasis added).  Such a statement is indicative of social agencies’ ability to 
communicate with policymakers, and those policymakers’ willingness to use such 
information to inform policy decisions.   
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Committees were another method by which the voluntary sector was involved 
with policymakers at a federal level.  In 1961, Tracy S. Voorhees, President 
Eisenhower’s Personal Representative for Cuban Refugees, recommended the 
establishment of an advisory committee on Cuban refugees (Mitchell 1961b).  Speaking 
of this committee, Voorhees recommended that representatives of all connected 
voluntary agencies, usually the heads, be involved.  Their involvement, in Voorhees’ 
words, would “give them all the feeling […] that they were part of it and were being 
actively consulted.  Also this would tend to minimize friction between these 
organizations, keep them working together as a team, and diminish labor opposition” 
(Mitchell 1961b, p. 5).  This quote emphasizes a dual importance of voluntary 
organization involvement at the federal level; it instills feelings of involvement, while 
aiding in the efficient use of resources.   
Involvement with federal agencies, whether in Washington D.C. or at the Cuban 
Refugee Center in Miami, put voluntary agencies squarely in the middle of discussions 
on refugee policies.  Their expertise in the on-the-ground-execution of federal refugee 
programs also put them in a position of advocacy for refugees when programs were not 
considered to meet their real needs.  One program involved with the Cuban Refugee 
Center, the Christian Community Service Agency of Dade County (CCSA), sent a letter 
to Harry B. Lyford of the Center stating that, “[w]e will attempt […], in our casework 
service, to put pressure on the Cuban Refugee Center to meet the refugees’ needs” (Smith 
1969, p. 2, emphasis added).  The letter goes on to state, “[w]e will continue as an 
agency to voice to the community our concern about the refugees’ plight and the staff 
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will attempt to play an advocacy role with the Refugee Center and with the various 
community agencies” (Smith 1969, p. 2, emphasis added).  The sentiments of “pressure” 
and “advocacy” expressed in these statements suggest that CCSA sees itself not as an 
unwitting pawn, but rather as a partner – critical if need be - working together to 
improve the services offered to refugees.    
Trudeau recognized the interdependent nature of the relationship between 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations.  His understanding of the shadow 
state goes further in explaining the complex relationships that exist in the welfare 
sector.  However, as I will show in the following section, a further extension of the 
shadow state construct is in order. 
 
Including Refugees in the Shadow State  
 
 
 Conceptual understandings of the shadow state that omit the role of refugees 
leave out an important aspect of the devolution of welfare services.  The conception of 
the shadow state construct by Geiger and Wolch added greatly to our understanding of 
the devolution of welfare services.  Trudeau correctly establishes the fact that 
relationships between governmental and nongovernmental organizations are indeed 
multi-directional and that governmental agencies rely on voluntary organizations for 
on-the-ground information and expertise.  However, Trudeau does not consider the 
ability of refugees to influence this construct.  It is the aim of this research to illustrate 
how, through participation with voluntary organizations, refugees should be included 
in an extended understanding of the shadow state.  In this section, information from 
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Cuban Refugee Center documents will be used to establish a historical context of refugee 
involvement within the Cuban diaspora. 
 As mentioned previously, resettlement was a major priority of the Center.  In a 
1962 letter from A.A. Micocci, Staff Adviser at the Cuban Refugee Program, to Brevard 
Crihfield, Secretary of the Governor’s Conference, Micocci emphasizes the need for, “all 
the help we can get from all quarters” to aid in the resettlement process (Micocci 1962a, 
p. 2).  The resettled Cuban refugees were an important group to aid Micocci’s effort 
(Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962; Micocci 1962b; 
Ribicoff 1962).  In a letter sent from Marshall Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, 
to resettled Cuban refugees he states, 
[Y]our continued successful resettlement will pave the way to 
helping us aid other Cubans to find jobs and resettlement. […] 
Would you, therefore, write me of your experience in your job, of 
the cooperation you received, of the assistance given you during 
the first days, your impressions of your new home, surroundings, 
your new life? […] If you know of other possibilities in your new 
environment for resettling Cubans, please let me know (Micocci 
1962b, p. 2).   
 
In an effort to resettle other refugees, the Center turned to those who had already been 
resettled for help.  This was also an opportunity for resettled refugees to contact those 
in charge of the Cuban Refugee Program directly.  In another letter, prepared for those 
ready to be resettled, J. Arthur Lazell, Deputy Director for Resettlement at the Center, 
writes, “It is most important that when any problem arises, you immediately contact 
your local sponsoring organization for its members will guide and counsel you” 
(Micocci 1962b, p. 4).  Again, refugees are provided with channels of communication; in 
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this case, those channels are through their voluntary agency.  Such feedback, as seen in 
the preceding section, is passed on to the Center through the VOLAGs. 
 While much of the feedback solicited from resettled refugees was to be used in 
encouraging other refugees to resettle, it was also seen as an opportunity for Cubans to 
help other Cubans (Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962; 
Micocci 1962b; Ribicoff 1962).  Feedback on resettled refugees reached all levels.  In one 
instance, Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that, 
“[r]eports about the 25,000 refugees already resettled outside Miami are good.  From the 
Cubans we hear about their new jobs, their new friends, and their new employers” 
(Ribicoff 1962, p. 3).  Information collected by the Cuban Refugee Center included 
questionnaires that inquired about the refugees’ experiences in their new cities (Cuban 
Refugee Center 1962).  The center used this information to inform newly arriving 
refugees about resettlement options.  In one instance, Cuban personnel from the Center 
organized an exhibit at the 1962 Conference of Mayors in Miami Beach (Cuban Refugee 
Center 1962).  These staff members were available to answer questions from attendees, 
specifically about the initiation of resettlement opportunities in their communities 
(Cuban Refugee Center 1962).  This is a more direct form of Cubans helping Cubans, the 
employment of Cubans in refugee organizations.  Cuban volunteers made up an 
important part of the Cuban Refugee Center.  In a 1966 statement released by the 
International Rescue Committee, one of four major VOLAGs associated with the Center, 
the centrality of Cuban volunteers is made clear, “[w]e did not know that what started 
as an operation staffed by Cuban volunteers [referring to the Cuban Refugee Center] would 
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grow into a permanent set-up” (IRC 1966, p. 1, emphasis added).  Further evidence of 
the centrality of Cubans’ role in the resettlement of newly arrived Cuban refugees come 
from a letter sent from Howard H. Palmatier, Deputy Director of the Cuban Refugee 
Program, to Raul Lastra, President of the Organization of Cuban Educators in Exile, in 
1969.  In this letter Palmatier states, 
I do want to underline, however, that we rely greatly on the 
goodwill and cooperation of Cubans in the United States – be they 
refugees, or long-time residents of this country. They have 
provided valuable assistance to newcomers and we earnestly seek 
their continued assistance (Palmatier 1969, p. 1). 
 
The role of Cubans in assisting refugees is further emphasized in a statement made by 
Lazell, Deputy Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, in a letter to Commissioner William 
Mitchell, of the Social Security Administration, in which he states,  
The greatest need at the Center and within the agencies is sufficient 
personnel for objective counseling of refugees prior to their 
departure from Miami, persons who know the United States and 
refugee psychology.  Cuban personnel cannot do this work adequately 
(Lazell 1962a, p. 2, emphasis added).   
 
From this quote we learn two important details.  First, that Cubans are already 
beginning to make up part of the personnel in these organizations.  Second, we learn 
that they are considered adequate for some work, i.e. manning an exhibit and 
answering questions from the public, and inadequate for other work, i.e. counseling 
refugees preparing for resettlement.  This phenomenon will be explored in greater 
detail later in this thesis.  However, it is of great significance that Cubans came to 
occupy positions within these organizations – both governmental and 
nongovernmental.  The role of refugees in refugee organizations is, as will be argued 
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later, the primary manner by which refugees can exert the greatest influence on the 
refugee program.   
 As seen in the previous section, refugees make up a significant portion of the 
staff of refugee organizations.  Nevertheless, non-refugees make up part of the 
personnel and, through daily contact with refugees, can provide important insights into 
refugee concerns.  Lasa, a staff member at the Center and Liaison for the Miami Cuban 
Community, took advantage of the daily contact between non-refugee personnel at the 
Cuban Refugee Center and refugees, to survey non-refugee employees regarding the 
refugees’ main objections to resettlement outside of Miami.  Lasa then addressed these 
main objections in a letter campaign to refugees in the Miami area (Cuban Refugee 
Center 1962).  Lasa used information gleaned by Center personnel from refugees to 
better address refugee concerns.  He also received, “Cuban refugee groups and 
individuals that come to the Director’s office with complaints, problems, etc.” (Cuban 
Refugee Center 1962, p. 5).   
What is clear from the Cuban Refugee Center documents is that, whether through 
voluntary organizations or the Center itself, channels of communication are open to 
refugees.  Furthermore, as illustrated by the following quote, such channels are used.  
“Many Cubans say that they want to stay in Miami so that they can get back to Cuba 
quickly when the time comes […] the United States will get them back there promptly, 
as soon as it is possible for them to return to Cuba” (Ribicoff 1962, p. 6).  This quote, 
from the person in charge of all refugee operations in the United States, shows a 
knowledge and understanding of refugee concerns – namely the concern of straying too 
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far from Miami.  In response to this sentiment, the refugee program instituted a return 
clause in all resettlement agreements to alleviate this concern.11  Other instances of 
refugee involvement are abundant in the documents.  For example, in a Congressional 
Subcommittee meeting, the New York Association for New Americans, which served 
Cuban-Jewish refugees who settled in metropolitan New York, suggested the provision 
of grants or loans to aid exile professionals in re-validating their credentials, allowing 
them to practice their profession in the US (Soskis 1966).  Philip Soskis, Executive 
Director of the program, continued: 
For some of the professionally trained men and women such as 
pharmacists or dentists, there has been a great deal of 
discouragement because they have been unable to resume practice 
in their own specialty in the United States. […] I am pleased that 
the Committee will be able to hear direct testimony from one of our 
former clients, Mrs. Regina Perez, who […] will describe how she 
and her husband have been able to use their former skills (Soskis 
1966, p. 9). 
 
 Mrs. Perez, as well as other Cuban refugees, was able to voice her experiences 
and concerns directly to a Congressional Subcommittee through the voluntary agency 
that aided her upon arriving to the United States.  Personal testimony, such as that 
given by Mrs. Perez, was welcomed by the subcommittee.  In his opening statement the 
Chairman of the subcommittee, Edward Kennedy, stated that,  
“[w]e are happy to have with us today several witnesses, including 
a number of resettled Cuban refugees, who will relate their 
experiences with the resettlement program.  […] We hope that the 
on-location hearings […] will […] put the Subcommittee and the 
entire Congress in a better position to make recommendations and 
                                                 
11 The clause guaranteed return passage to Miami if and when the Castro regime fell. 
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pass legislation for the benefit of all concerned” (Kennedy, E.M. 
1966, p. 2).   
 
Cuban professionals also took the initiative to form their own organizations.  In 
one instance, a group of exiled Cuban lawyers organized as the “National Association 
of Cuban Lawyers” (Quifiones 1969).  They used this organization to request a meeting 
with the Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, Ballafonte, to discuss their needs and 
concerns (i.e. revalidation of credentials) (Quifiones 1969).  Other organizations, such as 
the Cuban Hebrew Circle in Miami – a “self-help organization of Cuban refugees” -, 
were formed by Cubans for the mutual strengthening of Cuban refugees (United HIAS 
Service 1967, p. 5).  This self-motivation attracted the attention of public servants and 
welfare organizations alike who considered Cubans to be invaluable employees.  In one 
example, Senator Robert Kennedy relates the experience of James Dumpson, a former 
New York City Welfare Commissioner, who “went to Miami and recruited a number of 
Cuban refugees to serve as case workers and investigators for the Welfare Department” 
(Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).  Senator Robert Kennedy recommends that other 
departments in New York City consider following Dumpson’s example, stating that, 
“[o]ur city government should be as responsive as it can be to the needs of our Spanish-
speaking citizens” (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4). 
The feedback to the federal level, where legislation concerning refugees is made, 
is a key component of the ways in which refugees influence refugee-related policy.  
Voluntary organizations often serve as the platform through which such 
communication occurs, as illustrated in the following example.  In April of 1966, the 
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New York Association for New Americans testified before a Congressional 
Subcommittee (Soskis 1966).  In this testimony, they stated that Cuban refugees were 
putting down deep roots in the United States, but that in order to fully adjust they 
would have to be offered a path to permanent residency and citizenship (Soskis 1966).  
The testimony states,  
We do, therefore, hope that your Committee will find ways and 
means of recommending the necessary measures to Congress so 
that the status of the individuals can be regularized and they can 
attain the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship in the United 
States for which they have a deep longing (Soskis 1966, p. 10).  
 
One member of that subcommittee was Senator Robert Kennedy, who stated that same 
day,  
[W]e must take legislative action to clear up an unfortunate 
anomaly regarding the legal status of our Cuban friends who are in 
this country.  Under the law, they are admitted as “parolees.”  This 
means that because they have not come into this country under the 
usual immigration procedures, they cannot become permanent 
resident aliens – and therefore eligible for citizenship – unless they 
first leave the country, go elsewhere, and reapply for admission 
through the normal channels and under the normal priorities.  I 
believe this is unfortunate (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4). 
      
Later that year, on November 2, 1966, Congress passed the “Cuban Adjustment Act,” 
which allowed thousands of Cubans to adjust their status from “parolee” (temporary 
permission to be in the US) to Lawful Permanent Resident (permanent permission to 
reside in the US) (USCIS).  This is one example that indicates that voluntary 
organizations are familiar with the needs of Cuban refugees.  They presented the needs 
of their clients before Congress, contributing to a new law that was passed just months 
afterwards.   
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 Fundamental to an understanding of the shadow state construct is the notion 
that voluntary organizations provide communication channels for refugees.  I have 
already discussed channels, such as letter campaigns and government-administered 
questionnaires (through the federal Cuban Refugee Center).  Questionnaires administered 
by VOLAGs to their former clients is another example.  Earlier I discussed the New 
York Association for New Americans testimony before Congress.  In the testimony, the 
organization stated that Cubans were putting down roots in the United States and that 
their legal status had to be regularized before full adjustment could take place (Soskis 
1966).  This information was gleaned from a survey administered to 100 families by the 
organization (ibid.).  The association stated that the survey gave them the opportunity 
to renew contacts with past clients, determining how they had adjusted to life in the US 
(ibid.).  This survey, conducted through interviews and home visits, provided the 
organization with information directly from refugees (ibid.).   
 Surveys administered by voluntary organizations provide invaluable feedback to 
the federal government.  Such surveys are also of great use to voluntary organizations.  
One such survey, conducted by the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), 
requested that individual Diocesan Resettlement Directors and Directors of Special 
Cuban Refugee Committees, send a “Family Survey” questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to 
Cuban refugee families (McCarthy 1967).  This survey was designed to obtain, 
“personal observations of our program” to “improve and reevaluate our Cuban 
Refugee Program” (McCarthy 1967, p.1).  In a letter sent to questionnaire participants in 
1967 (see Appendix 2), the USCC states that, “In our constant endeavor to give better 
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service […] we prepare many studies and seek a great deal of expert advice.  In order to 
help us help your fellow countrymen more efficiently and effectively, please fill out the 
enclosed ‘Family Survey’” (McCarthy 1967, p.2).  The “Family Survey” included 
questions about the family’s adjustment and about the service that they received from 
the organization.  For example, the survey asked participants, “What problems did you 
find to be the most difficult in resettling in this country?”, “Please tell us frankly how 
the services you received from our organization […] were helpful to you and your 
family.  If not helpful, please Explain.”, “What other services would have been of 
additional help in your beginning here?”, and finally, “We hope you will add any other 
information you believe will be helpful to our understanding of your life in this 
country” (McCarthy 1967, pp. 5-6).  Such questions provide refugees with a direct 
channel of communication to organizations.  As we have seen, voluntary organizations 
can and do use feedback from refugees to address concerns on both an organizational 
and federal level. 
 Finally, federal agencies such as the Cuban Refugee Program, utilized 
questionnaires as well.  In a letter sent to Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, on 
the 14th of February 1963, John F. Thomas, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, 
states that, “A questionnaire is being circulated tomorrow by the Cuban Revolutionary 
Council to the members of Brigade 2506 [Brigade involved in the Bay of Pigs] to 
determine their needs and desires” (Thomas 1963, p. 12, emphasis added).  Channels of 
communication, while mostly easily accessed through voluntary organizations, were 
even available between the federal government and refugees.  The existence of such 
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channels strongly supports, as argued here, the extension of the shadow state to include 
refugees. 
 Resettlement documents provide a clear lens through which to understand the 
relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations.  Resettlement 
was the primary objective of the federally instituted Center, and voluntary 
organizations were the tools by which that objective was executed.  Such a relationship 
is in line with the shadow state construct as understood by Geiger and Wolch.  
However, further investigation reveals an interdependent relationship between these 
organizations, just as Trudeau would expect.  Clear channels of communication 
between refugees and organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, support 
an extended understanding of the shadow state construct, as argued in this thesis.  
 
Catholic Charities – Miami, FL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Catholic Charities USA (CCUSA) was founded in 1910 to advocate for social 
justice (Catholic Charities 2011a).  They have “served as a national advocate for the 
most vulnerable in our nation, including children, the elderly, the disabled, [and] 
immigrants” (Catholic Charities 2011b).  According to the 2009 Catholic Charities at a 
Glance report, CCUSA received 67% of their revenue from the government (Catholic 
Charities 2009).  With this funding, CCUSA supports local agencies through advocacy, 
networking, training, financial support and leadership (Catholic Charities 2011a).  The 
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Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities in Miami is one of many local 
organizations that CCUSA supports.  
The following section will be broken into three subsections.  They explore three 
ways in which refugees can and do participate in the Refugee Resettlement Program, 
and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole.  The three sections will be Feedback, 
Experience, and Becoming Part of the Organization.   
 
Feedback 
 
 
  Volunteer organizations allow, even encourage, participation from refugees in 
many ways.  Feedback is a primary method through which refugees influence the 
provision of services, and even what services are available.  I observed feedback from 
refugees, sometimes solicited and sometimes simply received, in a variety of settings.  I 
will discuss several methods of feedback in this section.  
 In October 2008, voluntary organizations involved in the resettlement of Cuban 
refugees in Miami produced a film for the United States Interest Section in Havana 
entitled, Tu Nueva Vida en Estados Unidos: Consejos de cubanos en Miami (Your New Life 
in the United States: Advice from Cubans in Miami).  This film is intended to provide 
Cuban refugees who prepare to come to the United States advice regarding their new 
life.  The almost two hour long video is comprised of interviews with VOLAG 
employees and refugees (we will see later that these two groups are hardly mutually 
exclusive).  The video explains the refugee process and the programs that will be at 
their disposal.  However, a significant portion of the video is devoted to refugees who 
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already are in Miami.  Early on in the video the narrator, a member of the Miami 
VOLAG community, says, “Les preguntamos a muchos de los refugiados [Cubanos] 
que consejos les hubiera gustado escuchar antes de venir a los Estados Unidos” (We 
asked many of the [Cuban] refugees what counsel they would have liked to hear before 
coming to the United States) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 35:55).  The subsequent 
section of the video is devoted to Cuban refugees in Miami who offer their advice, 
based on their experience, to those who are preparing for life in the United States.  
Beyond the obvious influence of already resettled refugees on new refugees, they were 
also influencing voluntary organizations.  This was an opportunity for those who are 
served by VOLAGs to provide direct feedback to the agencies at their disposal.  
Furthermore, the agencies listened to this feedback, because they included advice of 
Cuban refugees in the video.  By allowing current refugees to express what they wished 
they had known before arriving in the US (something that apparently was not 
addressed adequately by their VOLAG), the VOLAG is addressing that issue more 
clearly with future refugees. 
 The use of resettled refugees is a significant part of the video.  However, the 
refugees also serve the needs of the organization.  In one part of the video, recently 
resettled refugees talk about the advantages of resettlement outside of Miami.  The 
refugees share stories of acquaintances that have relocated outside of Miami, and the 
benefits that they have received as a result of their relocation.12  Interestingly though, 
                                                 
12 Refugees who resettle outside Miami receive more generous resettlement aid because they do not 
generally have family to support them. 
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the video only portrays Cuban refugees in Miami.  This is of great concern to Miami-
Dade County.  The County is closed to refugee resettlement outside of family 
reunification – a response to the enormous number of refugees who already resettled in 
the County.  That these refugees would even be speaking about relocation emphasizes 
the importance of their recommendation and speaks to the influence that past refugees 
can have on future refugees.  This, however, is not a controlling top-down use of power 
by VOLAGs over refugees.  There is a strong interdependence between voluntary 
organizations and the families of Cuban refugees in Miami.  One cannot fully succeed 
without the other – a point addressed throughout the video by VOLAG employees.  
One such employee, speaking of the family and the Cuban community in Miami, put it 
this way, “[La familia es] una mano de ayuda muy importante para nosotros. […].  La 
comunidad [Cubana] ha sido muy util en el proceso de reasentamiento Cubano” ([The 
family is] a very important helping hand for us.  […] The [Cuban] community has been 
very useful in the Cuban resettlement process) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 13:00).  
The agencies in Miami depend on help from families to support newly arrived refugees.  
The financial assistance received by the refugee helps to offset the costs incurred by the 
family, but the family provides the foundation for successful resettlement.  This does 
not preclude the role of the VOLAG, and in fact refugees are counseled by past-refugees 
to stay in close contact with their agency (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 12:12).  
VOLAGs are an important part of a newly arrived refugees’ life.  One VOLAG 
employee put it this way, “Esta oficina [Catholic Charities] y todo los de mas que 
trabajan con refugiados [VOLAGs] son sus aliados, son sus amigos” (This organization 
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[Catholic Charities] and all who work with refugees [VOLAGs] are your allies, your 
friends) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 7:55).  The video goes on to implore refugees to 
stay in contact, to use their case worker’s wisdom.  “Es muy importante que antes de 
hacer nada […] que le pregunten a la persona que lo intrevistó porque la pesona lleva 
tiempo aqui [y] le va a decir lo mejor para usted” (It is very important that before you 
do anything that you ask the person who interviewed you, because that person has 
experience and will know what is best for you) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 8:40).  
The “interview” referred to is the “intake interview.”  This is a refugee’s first contact 
with their local agency, and the beginning of their relationship with their case worker.13   
The relationship between a refugee, or client, and the case worker is the first 
contact a refugee will have in the US.  The case worker’s role often extends beyond the 
ninety days of government funded resettlement services as a friend and a counselor.  
The “intake interview” is the first meeting and an important opportunity for refugees to 
be prepared to provide feedback.  The interview serves two important functions for the 
establishment of future feedback.  The first is the establishment of channels of 
communications and a relationship of trust.  The second is the provision of insightful 
case management to provide services tailored to the need of the individual refugee. 
The establishment of communication channels with the organization is perhaps 
the most important step that refugees can take towards influencing the services that are 
provided to them.  These channels are opened during the intake interview when 
                                                 
13 Each refugee is assigned a designated case worker. 
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refugees are informed of their rights, including the right to complain, by their case 
worker.  During one such interview that I observed in Catholic Charities, the case 
worker asked a new client to read the contract between herself and the organization out 
loud, ensuring complete understanding of her rights and obligations.  The refugees’ 
right to complain is one channel of communication between themselves and their case 
workers.  However, the right to complain would be of little use without a relationship 
of trust.  This is another integral part of the intake interview.  Such trust is built by an 
organization through the careful and insightful management of cases.  Each refugee 
arrives with different needs and it is the case worker’s responsibility to recognize those 
needs, even if they are not expressed by the refugee, and to address them.  During one 
intake interview that I observed at Catholic Charities, the refugees, a young mother and 
daughter, were being resettled with a local family member.  This family member did 
not have any form of transportation, nor the ability to arrange transportation.  The case 
worker, through observation, began to arrange a bus pass that is not generally provided 
at this early stage.  After this particular interview, I asked the Volunteer Coordinator if 
such flexibility was common place in the organization.  He informed me that this case 
worker’s action was quite common and encouraged.  He went on to explain that no two 
cases were alike and that each case worker is encouraged to tailor services to meet the 
needs of each client.  Such special arrangements, he continued, had to be approved by 
the bosses, but that this was hardly ever an issue.  Any help that contributes to 
employment and/or independence, the two primary goals of the program, is always 
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considered – help with rent, down payments, additional education, etc.14  Such insight 
depends on perceptive case workers, and as will be explored later in this thesis, is 
greatly aided by the refugee experiences of most workers. 
This flexibility and perceptiveness aids in the establishment of relationships of 
trust, and therefore encourages the use of established channels of communication.  As 
individual refugees use those channels to voice concerns, or to ask for assistance, the 
organization becomes aware of the issues that refugees face.  In one particularly 
important instance, it came to the attention of the Program that local employers were 
not hiring certain refugees because of a misunderstanding of employment 
documentation.  In this particular instance it is important to highlight the difference 
between political prisoners and parolees.  Political prisoners enter the US as “refugees,” 
while parolees are considered “entrants.”  The majority of Cubans entering the US are 
“entrants,” and therefore require an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) in 
order to work.  Refugees, on the other hand, do not require an EAD, because their status 
automatically confers work authorization.  However, local employers had become 
accustomed to the EAD, and were wary of employing anyone who did not posses one.  
Refugees, who do not require an EAD, were turned away by employers afraid of hiring 
anyone without an EAD.  The Program became aware of this when refugees contacted 
their case workers about this problem.  Local VOLAGs brought this issue to the 
attention of government authorities and a statement was issued, explaining the 
                                                 
14 The two main goals of Catholic Charities are employment and independence.  Independence refers to 
economic and social independence (i.e. moving around the city alone). 
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situation to local employers.  This example highlights the important role of 
organizations to advocate for refugees, but more importantly, it highlights the role of 
refugee feedback in addressing the needs and concerns of the refugee community. 
Voluntary organizations work together to address issues, such as the 
aforementioned EAD problem.  Feedback from refugees is received by case workers, 
who in turn bring it to the attention of their organization.  The organization, in turn, can 
share it with the VOLAG community through monthly meetings of the VOLAG 
Consortium (Consortium).  These monthly meetings are an important opportunity for 
members of the VOLAG community to address issues that were brought to their 
attention by refugees.  Likewise, it is an opportunity to meet with leaders from 
governmental departments, such as the Department of Health and the Department of 
Children and Families.  A review of minutes from five months of meetings (January-
May, 2010) reveals multiple instances of refugee feedback that informed VOLAG and 
governmental action.  
In the February 2010 meeting minutes, a member of one of the VOLAGs 
expressed a concern regarding elderly refugees.  The Department of Social Security no 
longer sends a letter to refugees who qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  
Elderly refugees will not receive SSI without submitting an application, and the letter 
served as a reminder to refugees that they had to apply for SSI (South Florida VOLAG 
Consortium).  The VOLAG member had been made aware of a concern, the 
discontinuation of a SSI reminder letter, and brought that concern to the Consortium.  
In order to rectify this situation the Consortium agreed on the “importance of re-
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installing a relationship with Social Security Office […] [because] with all the new 
regulations we should have someone to raise our concerns” (South Florida VOLAG 
Consortium, p. 3, emphasis added).  In order to reinstall this relationship, the members 
of the Consortium suggest a liaison person within Social Security who can advocate for 
the needs of the VOLAG community and their clients. 
 One of the interesting elements of the Consortium is that it serves as a platform 
by which the VOLAG community can interact with governmental agencies.  On one 
level, it involves the direct participation of governmental agencies, i.e. the Department 
of Health and the Department of Children and Families.  On another level, it involves 
the scaling up of refugee concerns to the federal level of the Social Security office and, 
as I will show below, the Department of Motor Vehicles.  
 Refugees are vulnerable due to their limited resources and relative lack of 
experience in a new country.  Unfortunately, there are people who take advantage of 
this.  In the April 2010 minutes we learn of such an incidence.  A worker from Episcopal 
Migration Ministries (EMM) recounted an incident involving one of her clients at a local 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).  Due to discrepancies in the name of the refugee 
on several legal documents, the DMV worker refused to grant her a driver license.  
However, the refugee was able to obtain a driver license by paying someone at the 
DMV $100 (South Florida VOLAG Consortium).  Another worker, from the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) voiced a similar concern from one of her clients.  
All in attendance agreed that, “Issues like these are happening every day” (ibid., p. 2).  
To address these issues, the VOLAGs agreed to bring these issues to the attention of the 
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DMV Liaison at the next Refugee Task Force Meeting (ibid.).  This case reinforces the 
chain of communication, extending from the refugee, through their VOLAG, and 
ultimately to the respective governmental agency.  However, the case also makes 
reference to yet another tool through which VOLAGs can voice the concerns of their 
clients – the Refugee Task Force Meeting.  These are regional bi-monthly meetings 
hosted by the State of Florida Department of Children and Families.  These meetings, as 
referenced above, provide the VOLAG community access to the governmental 
departments necessary to address the concerns of refugees.  
 The VOLAG Consortium and the Refugee Task Force Meetings allow the 
VOLAGs to voice the concerns of their clients to other VOLAGs and governmental 
officials.  Neither of these meetings directly involves refugees.  Miami-Dade County is 
addressing this through the creation of the Miami-Dade County Refugee Advisors 
Panel (MDRAP).  The MDRAP serves under the direction of the Florida Department of 
Children and Families’ Director of Refugee Services Program.  The panel’s role is to 
provide feedback to the Director regarding refugee services and issues and concerns 
that refugees face.  Beyond the Director, the panel serves as a resource for voluntary 
agencies and local government as well (MDRAP 2009).  The MDRAP’s mission is to 
serve as an advisory panel to the Refugee Services program, facilitating a smoother 
resettlement process for newly arriving refugees (ibid.).  The role of the Refugee 
Advisors (panel members) is six fold: 
1. Help identify and prioritize refugee concerns and issues; 
2. Provide feedback on the suitability and helpfulness of 
services provided to refugees by RS funded providers; 
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3. Recommend policies, plans and procedures to promote 
effective delivery of services; 
4. Identify the particular needs of older refugees, children, and 
other refugees with special needs; 
5. Share materials and information relating to refugee matters 
among panel members; 
6. Be prepared to participate in the local Refugee Task Force to 
inform service providers of the needs or concerns of the 
refugee communities and to share information learned at the 
Task Force with other refugees.   
 
According to the panel guidelines, the thirteen members of the panel should include 
newly arrived refugees and those who have benefited from the refugee program within 
the past three years (ibid.).   
 The MDRAP is the newest channel of communication between refugees and their 
governmental and nongovernmental service providers.  As we have seen in this section, 
there are a plethora of channels for refugees to provide feedback and to participate in 
the resettlement process.  While these channels generally exist through resettlement 
agencies, the MDRAP provides an example of how refugees can provide direct 
feedback.   
 
Experience 
 
 
In each of the aforementioned cases, it is beneficial for prospective refugees to 
learn from the experiences of refugees in the US.  For example, the orientation video 
provided newly arrived refugees an opportunity to share their experience with those 
who have yet to arrive.  Case workers who were previous refugees also capitalize on 
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their personal experiences to help others.  I will explore the role of experience in the 
shadow state in this section. 
 As previously mentioned, refugees are encouraged to stay in close contact with 
their case worker.  The video, discussed in the last section, emphasized the importance 
of experience.  For example, at one point in the video VOLAG employees encouraged 
new refugees to consult with their case workers because they have already been 
through the resettlement experience (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 9:00).  Most case 
workers were refugees themselves and have, personally, passed through the same 
program that current clients are navigating.  Moreover, through their work with 
refugees, VOLAG employees are aware of issues that most refugees will encounter.  The 
video encourages refugees to ask their case worker for advice regarding everything, 
from continuing education programs to employment options, because their case worker 
often knows others who have participated in the same programs (Programa de 
Refugiados 2008, 7:55).  Refugees come to rely on the organization as they would on 
family for advice and support.  One refugee interviewed in the video, in reference to his 
voluntary agency, states that, “No he extrañado mis relaciones in Cuba porque me 
siento en casa” (I have not missed my relations in Cuba because I feel at home [in the 
US]) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 11:57).  One VOLAG employee provides 
encouragement to new refugees by emphasizing the fact that, “Todos hemos 
comenzado igual” (We all started the same [as refugees]) (Programa de Refugiados 
2008, 52:58).  Past experiences have come to define the approach that many case 
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workers take in helping current refugees.  This was particularly obvious in the weekly 
job seminars that were held at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities. 
 Every Monday, the Program holds a job seminar that is hosted by one of the 
agency’s employment specialists.  Each new refugee is required to attend this seminar 
once, generally the first Monday that it is offered after their arrival.  This seminar is 
meant to provide the refugees with a brief orientation to employment in the United 
States.  During my time with the organization I participated in three job seminars.  Two 
of these seminars were held by a Cuban employment specialist, while the other was 
given by a non-Cuban specialist.  An analysis of how these specialists approached the 
job seminar provides insight into how having been a refugee oneself influences how 
services are rendered.  
 The influence of the refugee experience on Valeria, the Cuban employment 
specialist, was immediately clear.15  “Yo, [como soy Cubana] lo veo desde el punto de 
vista de mi experiencia” (Me, [as I am Cuban] I see things from the point of view of my 
experience).  Valeria’s point of view is that of a Cuban refugee who has sat in the same 
chairs as those who attend her seminars.  She uses her experience to bond with the 
refugees over their shared experiences, life in Cuba and life as an exile.  These shared 
experiences allow Valeria to use her personal knowledge of Cuba to tailor her seminar 
to those in attendance.  To Valeria, her experience as a refugee is an integral part of how 
she teaches her seminars.  In her seminars, Valeria relates her personal experiences and 
                                                 
15 Names have been changed to protect the privacy of participants in this study. 
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discusses issues that she knows will be most relevant.  One such issue was job 
interviews.  Valeria asked if anybody had ever applied for a job or participated in a job 
interview, but none had.  Valeria already knew the answer to this question, but by 
asking she affirmed her knowledge of Cuba, and thereby affirmed her qualification to 
teach the seminar.  Valeria knows that, coming from a communist country where job 
interviews do not exist, none in attendance have ever participated in a job interview.  
This, as we will see later, is a point that escaped Valeria’s non-Cuban colleague 
Santiago.  She took the attendees step by step through the job application process.  This 
involved many steps that non-Cubans would take for granted.  For example, she taught 
them how to ask for and fill out a job application.  She went on to explain, primarily to 
the women in attendance, that daily household skills (i.e. childcare, cleaning, cooking, 
etc.) are valuable job skills.  As a Cuban, Valeria understood that the women in 
attendance did not feel that they were qualified to work.  However, because of her 
Cuban background, she knew that this was a concern and addressed it.  She also 
stressed that self-employment was legal in the US, and that they did not need to fear 
legal repercussions for entrepreneurship.  This issue could only be understood by 
someone who is familiar with Cuba, and it emphasizes the importance of the teacher’s 
understanding of the background of her clients.  In one instance, Valeria told the 
attendees that they needed to get out and explore the city.  She mentioned that she 
knows that their families have told them that they cannot go out alone, but that is not 
true.  This struck the refugees, who had indeed been told by their families that the 
streets were too dangerous to go out alone.  She encouraged them to start driving, but 
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to avoid the interstate, which would be too complicated to use right away.  This is 
another example of how Valeria used her experience as a refugee to tailor her message.  
Leaving the house alone, driving on the interstate, and the job application process were 
all issues that affected her resettlement, and therefore these issues have become part of 
her job seminar.  Valeria used her own experience to alter the standard mandatory job 
seminar to address issues that Cuban refugees are most likely to encounter.      
 The job seminar with Valeria’s colleague, Santiago, was an entirely different 
experience.  It was immediately clear that Santiago was not from Cuba (he was from 
Central America) and that he was not a refugee.  He did not make reference to his own 
experience.  This was a great difference from the majority of employees in the Program 
who were Cuban, and who referenced their own experiences frequently.  Santiago 
started his seminar by addressing the expectations of those present.  He told them that 
things will not be easy, but that it will not do anyone any good to “paint things rosy.”  
Instead of focusing on feelings and experiences, his seminar focused largely on the legal 
aspects of working in the US.  Santiago explained, clearly and concisely, the benefits 
afforded to legal workers in the US, such as social security, workers compensation, 
overtime, and unemployment.  In order to receive these benefits, he explained, an 
employee has to be legal.  He continued to explain the tax system and the importance of 
taxes in funding social programs, such as the ones aiding them.  Santiago also explained 
the employment system in the US so that those in attendance could understand.  After 
the seminar, Santiago explained to me that he felt that not being Cuban was an 
advantage.  He felt that Cuban employees were too concerned about the refugees, 
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painting a rosy picture of a harsh reality.  Not having been a refugee, Cuban or 
otherwise, hindered his ability to connect with participants.  A cultural disconnect was 
apparent on a few occasions.  In one instance, Santiago asked how far people had to 
walk to go to a job interview in Cuba.  This question was met with confused looks and 
silence.  Cubans, coming from a communist country, do not interview for jobs.  By 
assuming that the refugees had participated in job interviews, Santiago did not address 
this issue to a great extent in his seminar.  In another instance, Santiago discredited 
housework, and work in Cuba in general, as valid work experience.  He emphasized 
that work experience is experience in the US, not Cuba.  This was a direct contradiction 
of Valeria’s view.  Santiago was more susceptible to cultural missteps.  One time he 
randomly assigned the name “Hotel Fidel” to a fictitious place of employment.  This 
was met with looks of shock and surprise from the newly arrived refugees.  While 
Santiago presented important information in a clear and effective manner, his cultural 
disconnectedness and non-refugee status made the seminar less personable and harder 
to digest for the attendees.  While Valeria’s seminar was engaging and personable, 
Santiago’s was met with silence.  At one point Santiago even pressed for questions, 
warning that silence was only prejudicial to the participants themselves.  Ultimately, 
Valeria was able to use her own refugee experience and knowledge of Cuba to build a 
relationship of trust with the participants.  Furthermore, she possesses a keen insight 
into what refugees are most concerned about and understands how to address those 
concerns.  Overall, Santiago presented important information, as the program requires, 
but the experience and knowledge of Valeria contributed to a lively seminar and a 
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comfortable environment.  Many who were involved with resettlement organizations in 
Miami were refugees.  The following section will explore the influence of refugees on 
the resettlement agencies by becoming part of the organizations. 
 
Becoming Part of the Organization 
 
 
 Many past refugees are employed by resettlement programs in Miami.  They use 
their refugee experience to help new arrivals and to tailor available services to best meet 
the needs of their clients.  I will now describe biographies of Hiram Ruiz, Raul 
Hernandez, and Luisa Lois, who are involved in the refugee resettlement program at 
different levels.  Their stories differ, but they are all Cuban exiles, and they use their 
refugee experience in their current work.  The vignettes are based on autobiographical 
excerpts.   
Hiram Ruiz 
Hiram Ruiz is the Director of Refugee Services in the Florida 
Department of Children and Families. 
 
Born in Cuba and raised in Miami, Ruiz holds a Master of Social 
Work degree from Florida State University.  He spent 8 years as a 
social worker in predominantly immigrant neighborhoods in 
London, England and was later a social worker in Vietnamese 
refugee resettlement centers in Scotland and England.  Ruiz then 
spent three years with […] the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees [UNHCR], first in [the] UNHCR’s Social Service Office in 
Mogadishu, Somalia assisting urban Ethiopian refugees and then in 
Darfur, Sudan, as a field officer in refugee camps.  After returning 
to the United States, Ruiz joined the D.C. Government’s Refugee 
Program. 
 
Ruiz subsequently spent 16 years as a senior policy analyst with the 
U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), a private, Washington, D.C.-
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based refugee advocacy and public information group.  In that 
capacity, Ruiz traveled to more than 40 countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America to assess the needs of refugees and internally 
displaced persons and advocate for adequate U.S. and international 
responses.  Ruiz authored more than 20 publications on refugees 
and was a staff writer for USCR’s World Refugee Survey and Refugee 
Reports.  He spoke at numerous national and international 
conferences and testified before Congressional Committees.  Ruiz 
later served as Director of Communications for USCR and its 
parent organization, Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 
now USCRI.   
 
In 2004, Ruiz returned to Miami as a political director for the 
Service Employees International Union.   In October 2008, Ruiz was 
appointed director of DCF’s Refugee Services Program, the largest 
refugee program in the United States (Ruiz 2010). 
 
This biography provides a brief introduction to Hiram Ruiz and his 
accomplishments since he arrived in the US as a refugee.  Hiram, a Cuban, has been a 
refugee twice in his life, once under the Batista regime, and the second time under 
Castro (Spangler 2008).  Regarding his experience as a refugee, Hiram stated “There 
wasn’t very much by way of services.  Basically we got here, were given entry to the 
U.S., papers to be able to be here […] but it was definitely tough, and it wasn’t tough for 
months, it was tough for years” (Spangler 2008, p. 2).  He has since worked with 
refugees around the world.  As Director of Refugee Services for the Florida Department 
of Children and Families, a major goal of Hiram has been to bring refugee services 
closer to the refugees (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008).  He realized this goal, in part, by 
physically moving the office of Refugee Services from Tallahassee to Miami, Florida 
(where approximately 80% of refugees in Florida reside) (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008).  
Hiram emphasized that the move was indicative of the Department’s commitment to 
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respond to the needs of refugees and to be more directly involved in the refugee 
community (Crucet 2008).  He also instituted the Miami-Dade County Refugee 
Advisors Panel (MDRAP), discussed earlier in this paper.  Hiram has used his own 
experience as a refugee, and his years of experience working with refugees around the 
world, to emphasize the shared experiences of refugees across the globe.  The shared 
experience of exile is a strong uniting force, and one that has drawn many refugees into 
careers with VOLAGs, such as Catholic Charities. 
Dr. Raul E. Hernandez 
Raul E. Hernandez came to the U.S. from Cuba in 1980 as part of 
the Mariel boat lift.  He received a medical doctor degree from the 
University of Havana.  Since his arrival in the country [US] he has 
worked in refugee resettlement.  In 1980, he was hired by the 
University of Miami as camp manager of the Unaccompanied 
Minors Program serving Mariel Cuban children in Indiantown 
Gap, Pennsylvania.  During 1980 and 1981, he worked for HHS [the 
Department of Health and Human Services], the Cuban Haitian 
Task force, and a number of voluntary agencies processing Cuban 
Mariel arrivals at the refugee camp created in Fort Chaffee, 
Arkansas. 
 
From 1981 through 2007, Dr. Hernandez worked for Migration and 
Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops (MRS/USCCB) [holding] numerous responsibilities at the 
Arkansas Regional Office; New York City; and the Washington, DC 
national headquarters.  He headed a number of national programs, 
including the Resettlement of Cuban entrants; Match Grant and 
Wilson Fish employment programs; Unaccompanied Refugee 
Minors; building refugee processing capacity in Haiti; moving 
Cuban/Haitian minors out the Guantanamo’s U.S. Naval Base; 
resettling Kurdish-Iraqi asylees; and developing Refugee Mental 
Health Programs.  During his tenure he represented USCCB at 
numerous national and international events.  In 1996, he consulted 
with the Center for Applied Linguistics for the publication of 
“Cubans, their History and Culture”. 
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Before his retirement from MRS/USCCB in 2007, he led the 
Cuban/Haitian Program in Miami for 15 years.  He is currently the 
Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of 
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami (Hernandez 2009).     
 
 Raul Hernandez has worked with refugees across the United States since his 
arrival in 1980.  Describing this moment he writes:  
It was a breezy glorious day and the shore line was visible in the 
distance. […] After the years of repression, persecution, 
discrimination and fear, the feeling of actually being in the US was 
simply beyond description.  It was May 21, 1980.  We had arrived, 
and we were free! (Hernandez 2010). 
 
As the Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of Catholic Charities 
of the Archdioceses of Miami, Raul was my primary contact.  His refugee experience 
has instilled in him a great empathy for other refugees, making him a strong advocate 
for them.  He confirmed that many former refugees work in the Program and similar 
organizations.  One example is Luisa.      
Luisa Lois   
[My] family decided […] to apply to the Program of Visas for 
Political Prisoners because my father was being persecuted for not 
supporting the Revolution and spent many years in prison.  In 2005 
after two years of waiting, we traveled to the United States as 
Refugees.  […] We were assigned to Catholic Charities as new 
arrivals.  When the case manager that worked with me during this 
process saw my university and language degrees he informed me 
that there was an opening for a Case Manager position in the office.  
Needless to say that like every immigrant, I did not understand 
much the first days…but with the English that I brought with me 
and the help from my Job Developer, we completed the [resume] 
that opened the doors to a new life of work and life in Catholic 
Charities.  The process of interviews took three months.  […] I was 
chosen and started immediately as Case Manager for the Cuban-
Haitian Entrant-Program.  It was very instructive to work with 
people who had just arrived like me!  What could I tell them?  Well 
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that itself…I arrived three months ago as well!  They couldn’t 
believe it!  I progressively learned the work and was promoted to a 
position of Case Manager of the Match Grant Program only three 
months after starting in the company.  This was the test of fire.  It 
wasn’t just about carrying a file for only one month, it was six 
months of direct work with the client and attending to people that 
had arrived just as I had arrived a few months ago…looking for 
their first job!  For a Case Manager helping those who have just 
arrived is a hard task but when they finish the program after six 
months and you already see them working, adapted to the new life, 
living independently!  That is the biggest satisfaction that we have.  
In October 2008 I changed positions again.  Now [I am] working as 
a Job Developer […] I always loved helping the clients look for a 
job (Lois 2010). 
 
As a Job Developer in the Program, Luisa is in constant contact with newly 
arrived refugees.  Her own refugee experience has had a profound influence on her 
work.  Luisa often turns to her own experiences to guide newly arrived refugees 
through the employment process.  She uses her personal knowledge of life in Cuba and 
in Miami to tailor standardized messages to her primarily Cuban clientele.  Luisa 
understands that “the hardest thing for every immigrant is adapting to a new life and to 
[a] new language [and a new] country in which they are starting from ‘zero’” (Lois 
2010).  Luisa, Raul and Hiram have all used their experience as refugees to ease this 
period of transition and to tailor generic Federal services to the needs of their clientele. 
In this section I have shown how three Cuban refugees have turned their 
personal refugee experience into a career of service to new refugees.  These individuals, 
and many like them, use their experiences to better address the needs of Cuban 
refugees in Miami.  Hiram, Raul and Luisa have become part of the organization, using 
their experiences to mold their respective organizations to better fit the needs of new 
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refugees.  The employment of past refugees by governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations is the ultimate means by which refugees are involved in the shadow state. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis I have argued that current understandings of the shadow state are 
inadequate.  Geiger and Wolch (1986) only consider a top-down hierarchical 
relationship between the government and voluntary organizations.  Trudeau (2008) 
correctly argues that the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations is interdependent – governments depend on voluntary organizations for 
their on-the-ground expertise while voluntary organizations depend on the government 
for funding.  I argue that refugees play an integral part in the shadow state through 
their participation in voluntary organizations.    
In the previous section, I presented three ways in which refugees can participate 
in voluntary organizations, and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole.  By 
becoming part of their organizations, Hiram, Raul and Lucia used their personal 
refugee experiences to help other refugees.  Their stories are not unique.  Governmental 
and nongovernmental refugee resettlement organizations in Miami are staffed largely 
by Cuban refugees.  They each use their personal experience to improve the provision 
of services for new arrivals. 
The refugee experience shared by so many VOLAG employees aided greatly in 
the establishment of relationships of trust.  The shared refugee experience validates the 
VOLAG employee’s position in the eyes of a client.  Trust contributes to open channels 
of communication, bringing attention to issues that individual refugees could not solve 
alone.  The VOLAGs used a “flexible use of scale and scope” and were able to scale-up 
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issues of communal concern to state and federal governmental agencies (Kodras 1997, 
p. 80).   
Feedback from refugees depends on established channels of communication.  Such 
channels are multidirectional, as in the resettlement video that local Miami VOLAGs 
created in 2008.  They invited newly resettled refugees to share their experience and 
advice with those preparing for departure from Cuba.  The concerns and advice of the 
exiles often reflected perceived shortcomings of the resettlement process, such as the 
lack of reliable information about resettlement benefits.  The inclusion of these 
interviews in the video show that voluntary organizations implicitly acknowledged the 
shortcomings while addressing these issues through their inclusion in the video.   
As revealed in the Cuban Heritage Collection documents, the government relied 
greatly on on-the-ground expertise of voluntary agencies in Miami.  Moreover, the 
government relied on pre-established national networks of the VOLAGs to guide their 
national resettlement planning, funding resettlement only in locations where 
organizations had an on-the-ground presence.  Conversely, some VOLAG organizations 
felt that strong top-down support was necessary to further the resettlement of refugees 
throughout the US.  In a letter to the Director of the Cuban Refugee Program in the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, William J. vanden Heuvel, President of 
the International Rescue Committee (a VOLAG), asked the President of the United 
States to lend his strong support to the resettlement cause (vanden Heuvel 1963).   
An examination of the current literature reveals that instances of welfare 
devolution are common throughout the US and Western Europe (Cullen 2009; 
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DeVerteuil et al. 2002; Ferris 1998; Geiger and Wolch 1986; Henderson 2002; Kodras 
1997; Kramer 2000; Nevile 2009; Nightingale et al. 1997; Salamon 1999; Taylor and Bassi 
1998; Trudeau 2008; Wolch 1990, Wolch 1999, Wolch and Rocha 1993; Wright 1981; 
Young 2000).  Of particular interest to this thesis is the state of affairs in the US.  Budget 
difficulties have contributed to a call for reduction in welfare spending and increased 
privatization.  Despite the immediate sense of urgency that current politicians try to 
apply to each year’s budget, the reality is that such discussions are not new.  Salamon 
(1999) states that:  
[N]onprofit organizations have had to adjust to what appears to be 
a permanent situation of budgetary stringency.  This stringency [has] 
its origins in the conservative fiscal policies of the Reagan era of the 
early 1980s (p.8, emphasis added). 
 
Devolution of services continued beyond the Reagan administration.  During the 1990s, 
Republican Congressional leadership offered the US their Contract with America, 
promising a new era of fiscal responsibility.  Central to their plan was the bipartisan 
welfare reform legislation passed under the Clinton administration in 1996.  The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), as the 1996 bill was 
known, emphasized employment for those who receive welfare.  PRWORA shifted the 
responsibility of service provision to the state and local levels “[opening] the floodgates 
of devolution” (DeVerteuil et al. 2002). 
 “Budgetary stringency” has, as predicted by Salamon (1999), continued into the 
21st century (p. 8).  Financial constraints have resulted in increased collaboration 
between government and the nonprofit sector. “The numbers and variety of 
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arrangements thru which government and non profits collaborate are increasing as 
government seeks ways of squeezing more out of its limited resource base” (Young 
2000, p. 158).  In 2010, the Republican leadership, once again, reiterated its commitment 
to financial responsibility in its Pledge to America.  The near-shutdown of the federal 
government in early 2011 was only averted by deep spending cuts.  Strong bipartisan 
support for the privatization of welfare services suggests that the devolution of services 
will continue.  Accordingly, a deeper understanding of the effects of devolution on the 
provision of welfare services is necessary.   
This thesis has focused specifically on refugee benefits that Cuban exiles in 
Miami received.  The findings suggest that local voluntary organizations provide an 
opportunity for refugees to directly and indirectly influence the provision of services.  
Voluntary organizations have the ability to successfully scale-up refugee concerns and 
problems to state and federal governmental organizations that have the ability to 
implement policy changes.  I discussed the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 
1966 as one example how VOLAGs can scale-up the concerns of individual refugees.  In 
this case, VOLAGs served as a platform for refugees to address their needs, achieving 
legal permanent resident status.  
The findings in this thesis suggest that devolution can contribute to the 
democratization of welfare services, better enabling service providers to meet the needs 
of their clients.  To better understand the role of devolution in the democratization of 
welfare services, I recommend more case studies of geographically and culturally 
diverse populations.  Also, I suggest that studies should investigate if feedback, 
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experience, and becoming part of the organization exist as a means of influencing service 
provision among other types of welfare service providers (i.e. housing assistance, child 
care assistance, etc.).  If they do not exist, it would be beneficial to know if the 
incorporation of feedback, experience, and becoming part of the organization into diverse 
welfare organizations would improve the organizations’ ability to address the needs of 
their clientele.  I have argued that resettlement agencies have benefited from the 
employment of past-refugees.  Future research should investigate if past-clientele of 
other welfare organizations could similarly benefit their respective voluntary agencies.  
Finally, further research on civil society could provide insight into how civil society 
organizations democratize welfare services from the bottom-up.  Particularly, how 
groups less politically active and unified than Cubans utilize civil society organizations.      
Through the evidence provided in this thesis, it is clear that voluntary agencies 
are exercising a flexible use of scale and scope to scale-up the needs and concerns of their 
clientele.  Refugees have become part of organizations at many levels, and have used 
their own experiences to shape how resettlement organizations can better meet the 
needs of refugees.  The refugee resettlement program of Catholic Charities, the 
Archdiocese of Miami, has indeed led to the democratization of welfare services by 
providing “a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure a better 
match between programmes and migrants’ actual requirements” (Spencer 2005, p. 3).  
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